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"We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it
Their perch, and not their terror
'q
Introduction
On November 9, 2000, at around 11:00 a.m., Hussein 'Abayat, aged 37,
drove his car on one of the crowded streets of his village, Beit Sahur, in area
A in the West Bank, 2 when an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) helicopter cir-
cling above went into a dive and fired three missiles at him, killing him as
well as two women, Rahmeh Shahin and 'Aziza Muhammad Danun, both in
their fifties, who were standing outside a house awaiting a taxi. A few
other people were injured.3 Hussein 'Abayat was the first of at least 119
Palestinians killed thus far (end of September, 2002) by Israel pursuing an
official, publicly stated, policy of targeted killing, including 39 killed as by-
standers.
4
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act 2, sc. 1.
2. Under the terms of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip an
incremental transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian Authority was delineated.
See Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995, Isr.-P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 557 [hereinafter Oslo II]. Under the terms of Oslo II, Area A
was transferred to a full Palestinian civilian and military authority. See id.; see also infra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
3. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: STATE AsSASSI-
NATIONS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL KILLINGS 9 (2001), available at http://www.amnesty.org
[hereinafter STATE ASSASSINATIONS].
4. See B'TSELEM, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, List of Person (sic) Killed in the al-Aqsa Intifada, http://ww-w.btselem.org/
English/Statistics/Fatalities Lists/index.asp [hereinafter B'TSIELEM]. According to the
information provided in this website at least 1540 Palestinians were killed by Israelis
and at least 401 Israeli civilians and 179 Israeli soldiers were killed by Palestinians.
According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 451 Israeli civilians and 189 Israeli
soldiers have been killed so far. See Israel Defense Forces, Casualties during "Ebb and
Flow" since 29.09.00 updated 25.11.02 available at http://www.idf.il/daily-statistics/
english/6.gif (last visited Jun. 10, 2003). See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, VITHOUT DISTINC-
TION - ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS BY PALESTINIAN ARMED GROUPS (2002), http://www.amnesty.
org [hereinafter WITHOUT DISTINCTION] for information on the Palestinian attacks on
Israeli civilians.
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"Targeted preemptive killings" is the term used by Israel 5 to describe
one of the means it uses to combat what it labels as terrorist attacks
directed against its citizens, and what the Palestinians refer to as their
uprising against the Israeli occupation.6 While the "war against terror,"
especially in the horrific light of the burning twin towers of the World
Trade Center, is the banner behind which the well-defined forces of the
"good" unite against an imminently threatening, invisible and irrational
evil enemy, it does not follow that all means justify the end. Indeed, one of
the dangers inherent in uniting behind cliches is an ideological mystifica-
tion of reality, a reductive understanding of the latter and a consequent
loss of reflexivity. Self-criticism, however, much like the notion that the
end may well define means, but should never be confused with them, is an
essential component of the democratic discourse. Law contributes to this
discourse by providing normative grounds for claims of authority and by
delimiting the lines between permissible and impermissible behavior. The
legality of the policy of "targeted preemptive killings" and of specific acts
undertaken in its pursuit, is the subject matter of this article.
It is interesting to note in this context that while the Supreme Court of
Israel, operating in its capacity as a High Court of Justice (HCJ), 7 exercised
its jurisdiction to review various means of warfare used by Israel as part of
its security policy,8 it declined to subject the policy of "targeted preemptive
killings" to its judicial review, deeming it to be non-justiciable. 9 This deci-
5. See, e.g., STATF ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3.
6. Wars are being fought, inter alia, on rhetorical fronts intertwined with substan-
tive positions. The decision to use the term "targeted State killings" in the present article
was made in order to differentiate it both from the term "targeted preemptive actions"
used by Israel and designed to present the issue, a priori, as a legitimate act of self-
defense within the laws of war, and the term "extra-judicial killings/executions" used by
human rights organizations, and equally designed to prejudge the issue as an illegal
violation of the most basic human right. In the Israeli terminology, a Palestinian is
forever a terrorist, never a combatant, even if the objects of his attack are Israeli soldiers
advancing into his hometown. On the legal meaning of these terms see notes 215-23
and accompanying text.
7. The Supreme Court of Israel may also sit as a High Court of Justice, and "when
so sitting, it shall hear matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake
of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court." See, Basic Law:
judicature, 1984, 38 L.S.I. 101, 104 (1983-84).
8. See, e.g., F.H.H.C. 4110/92, Hess v. Minister of Def., 48(2) P.D. 811; H.C. 5100/
94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in lsr. v. Gov't of State of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817 [herein-
after Torture case]; Cr.F.H. 7048/97, Anonymous Persons v. Minister of Defense, 54(1)
P.D. 721 [hereinafter Bargaining Chips case]; H.C. 3022/02, LAW v. Commander of the
IDF in the W. Bank, 56(3) P.D. 9; H.C. 2977/02, Adallah v. Commander of the IDF in
the W. Bank, 56(3) P.D. 6 [hereinafter Adallah]; H.C. 2936/02, Med. Doctors for Human
Rights Ass'n. v. Commander of the IDF in the W. Bank, 56(3) P.D.3; H.C. 727/02,
Medic. Doctors for Human Rights Ass'n. v. Commander of the IDF in the Gaza Strip,
56(3) P.D. 39; H.C. 2117/02, Med. Doctors for Human Rights Ass'n. v. Commander of
the IDF in the W. Bank, 56(3) P.D. 26; H.C. 7015/02, Ajuri v. IDF Commander in Judea
& Samaria (judgment of Sept. 3, 2002, not yet published), available at http://court.gov.il
[hereinafter Assigned Residence case].
9. See H.C. 3114/02, Barakeh v. Minister of Def., 56(3) P.D. 11 [hereinafter
Barakeh case]. The bench consisted of Justices Matza, Cheshin and Levi and the deci-
sion was reached unanimously. Mr. Barakeh is the Chairman of the Hadash Party (The
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sion is not only inconsistent with the jurisprudence and practice of the
Court, but further forfeits the role it carved for itself as the guardian of the
rule of law in Israel, at the time when it is most vulnerable.' 0 It does not
follow, however, that either the HCJ"1 or other judicial instances, both
within 12 and outside 13 Israel, would not, in the future, subject said policy
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality). The Hadash Party is an Arab-Jewish socio-
political movement.
10. See e.g., Aharon Barak, When the Guns are Shooting the Muses Should Not be Silent,
YEDIOT ACHARONOT, Oct. 10, 2000, at 8.
11. An appeal by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and LAW - Pales-
tinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment Against the Gov-
ernment of Israel, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the IDF and the Chief of
Staff requesting an order nisi and an interim injunction against the policy of targeted
preemptive actions, currently awaits a judicial determination. See H.C. 5100/94 Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel et al.v. The State of Israel and the General Security
Service, 53(4) P.D. 817 [hereinafter LAW Appeal]. The appeal, concerning the Israeli
policy of targeted killings, was not rejected. Instead, on April 14, 2002, the Court
requested the parties to respond to questions pertaining to the applicable law and rele-
vant rules. It should be noted that under the Israeli legal system, the Supreme Court,
unlike other judicial instances, is not bound by the stare decisis principle. See Basic Law:
Judicature, art. 20(2), supra note 7, at 105. Our assumption that the court may well
reverse the position it has taken in the Barakeh case, supra note 9, rests further on recent
pronouncements made by BarakJ., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, on various pub-
lic occasions and reported in the press, which suggests that he regards the issue as
justiciable. See e.g., Ahron Barak, Between Security and Personal Freedom, MA'ARIV, May
10, 2002, at 14 (restating the essential points made by BarakJ., in the annual conference
of the Israeli Bar Association); see also Moshe Gorali, Can, and Should, the HCJ Preempt
the Preemptive Actions?, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 17, 2002, at B3.
12. The HCJ exercises an administrative, not a criminal, jurisdiction. Its decision on
the merits of a certain issue, however, carries with it far-ranging implications, which
extend, inter alia, to criminal prosecutions. This is so both because it provides appropri-
ate judicial instances that exercise criminal jurisdiction with the standard they are to
apply, and because it serves as a trigger for criminal prosecution, when appropriate.
Therefore, the decision of the HCJ sets the standard by which the legality of administra-
tive, and military, actions is measured. That standard then serves to guide the discretion
of the Attorney General or the Chief Military Advisor, as the case may be, in instituting
criminal proceedings in appropriate cases. Should an action be alleged to have deviated
from the standard in a manner that may generate criminal responsibility, it would thus
be incumbent upon them to initiate criminal proceedings against the suspects. Should
they refuse to do so, it would be possible to appeal to the HCJ. See e.g., H.C. 223/88,
Sheftel v. Attorney Gen., 43(4) P.D. 356; H.C. 425/89, Ztifan v. Chief Military Advisor,
43(4) P.D. 718; H.C. 935/89, Ganor v. Attorney Gen., 44(2) P.D. 485; H.C. 7074/93,
Swissa v. Attorney Gen., 48(2) P.D. 748; H.C. 3425/94, Ganor v. Attorney Gen., 50(4)
P.D. 1. It should be noted that no such proceedings were instituted thus far with respect
to any of the 80 targeted killings that have taken place over the past two years. It is
reasonable to assume that had the HCJ deliberated the issue on its merits, such proceed-
ings, at least with respect to some instances, would have been instituted.
13. The coming of age of international criminal law is grounded in the view that war
crimes are justiciable and that should the state most concerned fail to enforce the law,
judicial institutions of either the international community or of other states acting as
agents for that community are to rectify this failure and exercise jurisdiction over alleged
perpetrators of crimes. Thus, domestic courts might be encouraged to respond to such a
failure by the judiciary of a state by the exercise of universal jurisdiction. See Amnon
Reichman, When We Sit to Judge We Are Being Judged; The Israeli GSS Case, Ex Parte
Pinochet and Domestic/Global Deliberation, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'I & COMP. L. 41 (2001).
This failure might also be the triggering factor for the exercise of international jurisdic-
tion. For example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court bars the Court
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to their review. In so doing, they will determine the legality of the policy
according to the standards set by international law. 4 This article, in offer-
ing an analysis of the issue from the perspective of the relevant interna-
tional legal standards, hopes to contribute to this determination.
Law does not operate in a vacuum; the application of a legal text is
forever contextual. The context within which Israel pursues its policy of
"targeted preemptive killing" is the al-Aqsa Intifada. Indeed, the above-
noted exceptional resort by the HCJ of the non-justiciability doctrine to
dismiss an appeal challenging the legality of the policy, may be explained-
though not justified-by the acute distress from, and exceptional violence
of, the post-Oslo realities. It is truly telling, and a fortiori unprecedented,
that during the hearing of the appeal, Justice Cheshin, in response to the
question presented by the Applicant's representative as to why Israel does
not arrest, rather than assassinate, the targeted people, said: "my son, not
yours, goes into that area and I do not want to endanger him."' 5 The HCJ's
decisions do not rest on the ethnic identity of the Applicants and their
representatives. The conclusion to be drawn from this utterance is not that
had the Applicant or his representatives been Jewish, rather than Arab, citi-
zens of Israel, the decision would have necessarily been different. 16 This
gut reaction of the Judge, however, is important in two respects: first, it
explains, though it does not excuse, the a priori identification of the bench
with one party to the judicial process, the Respondent, and gives evidence
of its empathy towards the Respondent's difficult situation; second, it dis-
closes the oft-denied truth that the narrative seeks to determine the norma-
tive; 17 that competitive narratives present particular challenges to any
from exercising jurisdiction when the case is properly investigated or prosecuted by the
relevant state. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, arts.
22-23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome
Statute]; see also Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction
Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20,
27 (2001).
14. Resort to international law is not merely inherent in the exercise of universal or
international jurisdiction, it is also a source of law used by Israeli courts when they are
called upon to determine whether a certain policy or practice contravenes both domestic
and international law. Thus, for instance, in the Torture case, supra note 8, the Court
examined the legality of interrogation tactics employed by Israel's General Security Ser-
vice (GSS) against Palestinian detainees in light of the international prohibition on tor-
ture. In the Bargaining Chips case, supra note 8, the prolonged administrative detention
of Lebanese hostages for negotiations purposes was held to be illegal in light of, inter
alia, the conventional prohibition on taking of hostages. In the Assigned Residence case,
supra note 8, Israel's practice of assigning the residence of terrorists' family members
was analyzed solely in light of Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Attesting to
the Court's awareness of international scrutiny, this later case was introduced in the
English language, via the Court's web-site, on the day the decision was published.
15. See Gideon Levy, The HCJ and the Black Flag, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 3, 2002, at BI;
Avigdor Feldman, Speech at the Israeli Bar Association Annual Conference, "The Law
under Fire," 30 The Lawyer, June 2002, at 12.
16. This is not to deny that in a situation of an ethnic conflict, the liberal position
that the law's eyes are (wide) shut to ethnic identities, does not, in effect, operate in favor
of she who belongs to the dominant ethnic group.
17. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) for a
discussion on the interaction between law and collective narrative.
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attempt to reconcile them within a single normative framework; that the
legal text is contextual. The context of the ever-escalating violence and the
cycle of revenge, misery, and public outrage wrought by the al-Aqsa Intifada
on both sides of the conflict, and its consequential cheapening of human
life and humane values, is discussed in Section II of this article.
The discussion of the political and operational context offered in Sec-
tion II discloses the diametrically opposed, competing narratives of the
parties to the conflict, and gives rise to various questions pertaining to the
appropriate normative frameworks within which the legality of targeted
killings should be analyzed. Section III identifies the possible international
legal texts that may apply to this situation in order to determine the legality
of targeted state killings. This process of identification is not merely an
exercise in techno-legal classifications, for it is often the nature of intricate
political situations to defy the legal penchant for taxonomic elegance.
Indeed, it is far from clear whether the current post-Oslo fighting should be
subject to the Laws of War, 8 Humanitarian Law 19 or Human Rights
Law. 2 0 This complicated political situation may call for the concurrent
application of these supposedly distinct branches of international law, a
possibility that requires an inquiry into their interrelations, and further
questions the viability of applying traditional legal classifications to reali-
ties that defy traditional thinking. Having identified the legal regimes
applicable to the situation, this Section then discusses the legal status of
the targeted persons, and applies relevant provisions of these legal regimes
to the policy of targeted state killings to determine whether or not any of
them consider the policy permissible.
Section IV provides an integrative interpretation, suggesting that the
legality of targeted state killings in the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada
should be decided in the light of the interaction between the three legal
regimes. The discussion concludes that some actions of targeted killings
are justified; some are not justfied and entail state responsibility; while
some amount to a war crime requiring personal accountability. Finally,
this section offers a few observations regarding the rule of law and its role
in the context of the fight against terror.
1. The Context: Competing Narratives of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the
Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings
A. General
On November 9, 2000, shortly after Hussein 'Abayat, Rahmeh Shahin and
'Aziza Muhammad Danun were killed, 2' the IDF Spokesman issued the fol-
lowing announcement: "During an IDF-initiated action in the area of the
village of Beit-Sahur, missiles were launched by IDF helicopters at the vehi-
18. See infra notes 105-31 and accompanying text.
19. Namely, the Law of Belligerent Occupation; see infra notes 132-56 and accom-
panying text.
20. See infra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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cle of a senior Fatah/Tanzim activist. The pilot reported an accurate hit.
The activist was killed, and his aide, who accompanied him, was wounded
.... Abayat is suspected of having initiated and executed numerous shoot-
ing attacks in Beit Sahur, Gilo, and al-Khder during which three IDF
soldiers were killed .... The action this morning is a long-term activity
undertaken by the Israeli Security Forces, targeted at the groups responsi-
ble for the escalation of violence. ' 22
This brief statement is quite telling, both in what it says and in what it
neglects to say: (a) targeted liquidations reflect a state strategy; an official
policy; (b) the statement identifies the immediate context which gave rise
to the policy, referring to the "escalation of violence" that began 42 days
earlier; (c) the statement identifies the target by assigning blame to people
belonging to "groups responsible for the escalation of violence"; (d) the
statement is silent about the operational off-shoots of the "activity"-it fails
to mention the two innocent by-standers killed in the "accurate hit"; (e) the
statement, while referring to past misdeeds of the target, is silent about
either the immediate or future danger he posed.
At this writing, both the "escalation of violence"-the al-Aqsa
Intifada-and the practice of targeted state killings are in their 25th month.
The understanding of this context is crucial from the perspective of the
rule of law because the applicable law by which the legality of the policy of
targeted killings, or lack thereof, will be determined depends upon the nor-
mative characterization of the context.
B. Targeted Killings as a State Policy
Israel is not the only state that pursues a policy of liquidating its oppo-
nents. It is, however, the only state that, as of November 9, 2000, confirms
publicly that such activity occurs under government orders and reflects a
deliberate state policy. 23 This acknowledgement is not only unprecedented
22. STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3, at 8.
23. After the assassination of Dr. Thabet Thabet, on 31 December 2000, the Israeli
Deputy Minister of Defense, Ephraim Sneh, stated, "[W]e will hit all those involved in
terrorist operations, attacks or preparation for attacks, and the fact of having a position
within the Palestinian Authority confers no immunity on anyone." See STATE ASSASSINA-
TIONS, supra note 3, at 7. On December 21, 2000, Voice of Israel Radio confirmed, in a
briefing by an unnamed IDF officer, that there was a new policy of "pre-emptive opera-
tions," that it was targeted at terrorist-as opposed to political-leaders of Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and Fatah, that the main method used was sniper fire, and that the IDF
went to great lengths not to harm innocent by-standers. Id. In an interview conducted
by Amnesty International with Colonel Daniel Reisner, the Deputy Legal Adviser to the
IDF, Colonel Reisner confirmed that the operations are ordered at the highest level of
the army and the government, and are carried out by whatever means seem more appro-
priate in the circumstances. Id. Testifying before the Israeli Parliament Foreign Affairs
and Defense Committee, an unnamed high ranking official in the security forces stated
that "[t]he liquidation of wanted persons is proving itself useful . .. [tlhis activity
paralyses and frightens entire villages and as a result there are areas where people are
afraid to carry out hostile activities." See HA'ARETZ, Jan. 8, 2001, at B3. Such confirma-
tions, indeed, have become routine in the Israeli Press, and follow most such operations.
In LAW Appeal there are two tables, one presenting a list of targeted assassinations and
the other attempted such assassinations, and, in respect of each such operation, there is
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in comparison to the secrecy surrounding such activities carried out by
other governments, it also stands in contrast to Israel's own denial of liqui-
dating threats to Israelis in the relatively recent past.24 Indeed, Israel used
to refute past allegations of such practices vehemently, stating that "the
I.D.F. wholeheartedly rejects this accusation. There is no policy, and there
never will be a policy or a reality, of willful killings of suspects ...the
principle of the sanctity of life is a fundamental principle of the I.D.F.
There is no change and there will not be a change in this respect. ' 2 5 Ever
since November 9, 2000, however, the confirmation that such a policy does
exist and its reiteration in on-going reports concerning its successful exe-
cution, are part of the normal public discourse in Israel.
This openness regarding what presumably was an undercover opera-
tion in the past is quite extraordinary. On some level, it operates to create
and feed a public atmosphere that legitimizes these practices rather than
questions them. A public discourse that no longer upholds the "fundamen-
tal principle" of the "sanctity of life" may be an unconscious, denied and
suppressed consequence of this new openness, undermining the demo-
cratic process. 26 On another level, it may be a preemptive legal tactic,
designed to offer a legal justification for targeted state killings, on the
assumption that the government would be asked to provide such justifica-
tions. The legal advisers to the government are aware that "pinpointed pre-
ventive actions" may be considered an unconvincing euphemism for extra-
judicial executions and as such, illegal under both Israeli and international
law. By publicly admitting the policy of targeted state killings, Israel indi-
cates that far from engaging in the illegal activity of extra-judicial execu-
tions 2 7 or willful killings, 28 it is duly exercising its right of self-defense in a
an indication of whether the specific operation was confirmed by the IDF. See supra
note 11, at 9-14; see generally YAEL STEIN, B'TSELEM, ISRAEL'S ASSASSINATION POLICY:
EXTRA-JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS, (Maya Johnston trans. 2001), http://www.btselem.org/
Download/ExtrajudicialKillingsEng.doc (last visited June, 20, 2003) [hereinafter
B'TSELEM Report].
24. On operations during the early 1990's, see generally, NA'AMA YASHUVI, B'TSELEM,
ACTIVITY OF THE UNDERCOVER UNITS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1992), http://www.
btselem.org/Download/1992_UndercoverUnits-Eng.doc (last visited June 20, 2003)
[hereinafter ACTIVITY OF UNDERCOVER UNITS]; see also MIDDLE EAST WATCH, A LICENSE TO
KILL: ISRAELI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AGAINST "WANTED" AND MASKED PALESTINIANS
(1993).
25. ACTIVITY OF UNDERCOVER UNITS, supra note 24, at 90.
26. The point is underscored when, for instance, a Minister in the Israeli Govern-
ment opines that Israel should not put the leader of the Tanzim/Fatah, Marwan
Barghuti, whom it had arrested, on trial, but should rather "take him to a forest and put
a gun to his head," and that Minister remains in office and his comment seems to arouse
no wide criticism in Israel. See Poria Gal, Arafat is a Mad Murderer that Needs to Be Killed,
MA'ARIV, July 5, 2002, at 5. The Minister is Effi Eitam, the newly elected leader of the
Mafdal party.
27. The terms extra-judicial or extra-legal killings are used by human rights organi-
zations such as Amnesty International, B'Tselem, and Human Rights Watch. See e.g.,
STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3; see also B'TSELEM Report, supra note 23.
28. This is a term used in article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
designates such an act as a "grave breach" of the Convention. Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 75
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situation that amounts to an armed conflict appropriately governed by the
Laws of War.
2 9
The official Israeli narrative, therefore, is that the al-Aqsa lntifada is an
armed conflict, and the normative framework applicable to this narrative is
the international laws of war. It follows that if the Israeli construction of
the realities of the Intifada is correct, the legality or illegality of targeted
state killings must be determined by the application of international rules
governing armed conflicts. 30 It is, however, far from clear that the narra-
tive framework suggested by Israel offers either an accurate or comprehen-
sive description of the al-Aqsa Intifada to which the laws of war apply
exclusively.
C. Targeted Killings in the Context of the al-Aqsa Intifada
The al-Aqsa Intifada has a Rashonon quality to it, presenting a complex
puzzle, the parts of which do not necessarily join together to form a well-
defined picture. It broke out as an immediate reaction to a visit, on Sep-
tember 28, 2000, to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, by the then-opposition
leader, Ariel Sharon.3 1 The following day, in response to stones thrown at
Jewish worshipers from the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Israeli security
services entered the area around the Mosque and fired rubber-coated metal
bullets and live ammunition at the crowd, killing five Palestinians and
injuring about 200 more. Palestinian demonstrations throughout the terri-
tories and within Israel followed, and the vicious circle of vengeful violence
began. 32
While it is clearly outside the scope of the present article to describe
the Intifada and analyze its root causes and immediate and long-term polit-
ical consequences, it is nevertheless necessary to understand it from the
perspective of both parties, as the Israeli practice of targeted state killings
takes place in this context and serves as a central tool of Israeli security
policy in response to "the escalation of violence," and as a trigger for this
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See discussion infra section lI1.
4.4.
29. This position was articulated by Colonel Reisner in two interviews with Amnesty
International. See STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3, at 23-25.
30. For a substantive and comprehensive analysis of this legal position, see infra
section III.
31. It should be recalled in this context that sovereignty over Haram al-Sharif to
Palestinians and Temple Mount to Jews is one of the most sacred sites to both religions,
was one of the thorniest issues to be resolved as part of the final agreement status, and
one of the issues which account for the failure of the Camp David Summit. The Ameri-
can delegation spent countless hours seeking imaginative formulations to resolve it,
ranging from sovereignty of the Security Council to that of God himself. It is thus under-
stood why Sharon's visit to the site on a Friday, was considered a deliberate provocation.
See Natan Zach, Head of the Violence Camp, MA'ARIV, October 3, 2000, at 7.
32. On the roots and development of the al-Aqsa Intifada, see generally, INTERNA-
TIONAL CRISIS GROUP, A TIME TO LEAD: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE ISRAF-1I-
PALESTINE CONFLICT (2002) [hereinafter: ICG Report]; see also WITHOUT DISTINCTION,
supra note 4.
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very escalation in the form of retaliatory actions by the Palestinians. 3 3 It
does not take a particularly keen observer to understand that Sharon's visit
was only the provocative spark that ignited the fire; the overt excuse rather
than the deep reasons for the uprising. The latter have to be found in the
preceding seven years of an incremental peace-process gone awry, failing to
achieve its promise and forfeiting its premise that incrementalism would
allow for the building of mutual trust.34 The stages of the process are well
known and require but a brief reiteration of major milestones leading, alas,
not to a final status agreement but to the al-Aqsa Intifada and the recent
military re-occupation of the territories from which Israel previously with-
drew.3 5 Time does not stand still; but at least in the Middle East, the clock
momentarily appears to be turned back.3 6
33. A poignant example is the liquidation on January 14, 2002 of Riad Karmi. That
killing took place after 23 days of a cease-fire, declared and preserved by the Palestini-
ans, and according to the Palestinians was the reason for the collapse of the cease-fire.
Israelis maintained that Karmi, a Tanzim activist, was a "ticking bomb" who was travel-
ing freely despite the Palestinians' assertions to the contrary, and that the Palestinians
used his assassination as a convenient excuse for putting an end to a cease-fire they
never intended to last. Israelis find further support for this assertion in the interception
of Karin A, a ship containing massive quantities of ammunition which presumably was
heading towards Gaza. See ICG Report, supra note 32, at 7. Another example is the
killing of Salah Shehada, commander and founder of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
(the military wing of the Hamas Organization). His killing on July 23, 2002, put an end
to efforts on the part of the Palestinian Authority to reach a cease-fire agreement with the
Hamas. See Jacky Hugi, Arafat Admits: We've Made Mistakes against Israel, MA'ARIV, Aug.
4, 2002, at 8; see also infra text accompanying notes 278-79.
34. See THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE REPORT, April 30, 2001, SN
3552/01, at 5-6, available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060pf.htm, at 5-6
[hereinafter MITCHELL REPORT]. For an overview of the different agreements signed
between Israel and the Palestinians see GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORD: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS 41-53 (2000). The Decla-
ration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements established the
framework within which the parties were to move towards the final settlement of the
conflict's thorniest issues: final borders, settlements, Palestinian refugees, and Jerusa-
lem. See The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13
September 1993, Washington, D.C., 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993), available at http://
www.jmcc.org/peace/agreements.html. [hereinafter Oslo I]. It was deferred for the per-
manent status agreement, which was designed within a five-year timetable. During that
period, territories and functional authorities were to be transferred gradually from Israel
to the Palestinian Authority, building up its institutional capacity and allowing the par-
ties to gain experience in managing their relationship. This framework reflects an incre-
mental, process-oriented approach. See QUESTION OF VIOLATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING PALESTINE, U.N. Doc.
A/56/440 (2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch. The report of the Special Rap-
porteur of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, which was submitted to the U.N.
General Assembly by the Secretary General, naming the prolonged occupation of the
territories as the principle cause of the second Intifada, Id. at 7-8.
35. Roni Shaked, Back to the Civil Administration, YEDIOT ACHRONOT, June 28, 2002,
at 15.
36. The delimitation of any time frame, indeed the practice of periodization, is
always problematic, as each point in time which one side considers the cutting point
may be considered by another as part of a continuum. The decision that the relevant
time frame for our purposes begins with the Oslo Accords is no exception. It does not
follow, however, that the broader context of a prolonged occupation is absent from
either the discussion of the immediate context of the al-Aqsa Intifada or from our legal
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Following the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accord, delineating the frame-
work and the steps to reach a final settlement within five years, the parties
signed the Cairo Agreement in May 1994, detailing the implementation of
the process and triggering the five-year countdown for the permanent sta-
tus agreement. 37 Under the terms of the Cairo Accord, most of the Gaza
Strip and the town of Jericho were transferred to the newly constituted
Palestinian Authority. A subsequent Interim Agreement, signed on Septem-
ber 28, 1995, established three types of areas in the territories: In Area A,
full civilian and military control transferred to the Palestinian Authority;
Area B was placed under full Palestinian civilian authority and joint secur-
ity control, with Israel maintaining an overriding security responsibility;
Area C, including Israeli settlements and military installations, remained
under Israeli control. These areas do not represent a continuous territorial
zone but rather signify a jurisdictional scope: under the terms of Oslo II,
27% of the West Bank was to be under some form of Palestinian jurisdic-
tion, 3% in Area A and 24% in Area B. Further redeployment, transferring
additional, yet to be defined, territories to either an A or B status was also
noted.3 8 In short, the peace process was to implement gradually-and in a
manner that allowed the building of trust-the "land for peace" concept.
For Israel, this piecemeal process would test the viability of the "land
for peace" formula. "Peace," in that equation, meant a recognition of
Israel's right to exist, security for its citizens, and normalization of relation-
ships with the Arab and Muslim worlds. 39 "Land," in that equation, meant
a slow territorial withdrawal of control over Palestinian daily life. The
immediate implication of this understanding was that the less security
delivered, the more reluctant Israel was to withdraw from the territories.
Eventually, with the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minis-
ter, the notion of "reciprocity" came into the process, meaning that if the
Palestinians refused to comply with their security obligations under the
Interim Agreement, Israel would not deliver its part of the deal and with-
draw further from the territories. 40
Given that suicide bombings carried out by Palestinian groups in July
1995 and in March-April 1996 resulting in a death-toll of over fifty Israelis;
that the Palestinian Authority did not confiscate weapons defined as illegal
under the Interim Agreement; and that the Palestinian Authority did not
disband radical groups that attacked settlers and civilians in Israel, it is
analysis of what an occupying power can and cannot do in the face of resistance from
the population. See infra section III.D.3.
37. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, art. 23(3), 33
I.L.M. 622 (1994).
38. See Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 33 K.A.
1, reprinted in 36 1.L.M. 551 (1997), art. 5 of Annex 1, Protocol Concerning Redeploy-
ment and Security Arrangements.
39. This normalization included the peace agreement with Jordan, signed on Octo-
ber 26, 1994 as well as the lifting of the Arab boycott and the establishment of economic
ties with parts of the Arab and Muslim world. See Treaty of Peace Between the State of
Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Oct. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995).
40. See ICG Report, supra note 32, at 3-5
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understandable that Israel did not believe that the Palestinians delivered
their part of the equation. Israeli security measures in response to these
attacks included closures of towns and villages in the territories, with
harsh economic consequences for the population, continued construction
of settlements, land confiscation, and demolition of houses. The coupling
of these measures with political turmoil culminating in the murder of
Prime Minister Rabin, and the subsequent election of Netanyahu as Prime
Minister, provide evidence of the growing disenchantment of Israelis with
the Oslo peace-process. From their perspective, the Palestinians failed to
realize their pledge to resolve disputes through peaceful means alone: if the
Palestinians do not abandon violence, Israel will not abandon the territo-
ries. For Israel, it is "Security First."
4 1
The Palestinian mindset is a mirror image of Israel's. From their per-
spective it is Israel, not the Palestinian Authority, that reaped the fruits of
Oslo while failing to stand by its commitments: peace with Jordan, eco-
nomic ties with other Arab states, and security cooperation. At the same
time, Israel often postponed land transfer, and settlements, far from being
dismantled, continued to be expanded and constructed. Further, the Pales-
tinians, who recognized at Oslo Israel's right to exist in 78% of the historic
Palestine, were left with no tangible benefit, that is, with little or no control
over the West Bank and Gaza, in return for their historical compromise.
From a Palestinian point of view, the very signing of the Oslo Accord
expressed their part of the deal and, for any equation to exist, it was now
Israel's turn to deliver the land.4 2 The fact that by the time negotiations on
the final agreement were to end, they were yet to begin, underscores Israel's
failure to abide by the "land for peace" formula. Israel remained a de-facto
Occupying Power of Palestinian territories and, under the guise of a peace-
process, it demonstrated no intention to reach a final settlement, as that
would require it to dismantle the settlements and relinquish the land.4 3
Indeed, Israel managed to relinquish the obligations placed upon it as an
occupying power, while at the same time preventing the Palestinian Author-
ity from any real possibility of discharging its responsibilities to its people.
Two months separate the Camp David Summit of July 2000 (the last
attempt to revive the Oslo process as part of the final status negotiations
that began in late 1999) and the current Intifada and ensuing operations
(marking the death of the Oslo peace process). 4 4 While what actually took
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. On the question of Israel's position as an occupying power see infra section
IIl.B.2.
44. There were a few rounds of negotiations after Camp David, culminating in Janu-
ary 2001's negotiations in Taba, amidst the raging Intifada. In a joint communiqu6
issued at the close of the Taba negotiations on January 27, 2001, it was stated that "[tihe
sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our
shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotia-
tions following the Israeli elections." Ben Aluf, Israel and the Palestinians "We Have Never
Been Closer to Reaching an Agreement," HA'ARETZ, Jan. 28, 2001, at Al. By then it was too
late. President Clinton was moving out of office and Sharon was on his way into office.
See generally Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, N.Y.
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place at Camp David remains to be determined conclusively, 45 the far more
important consequence of its failure, that is, what most people on both
sides believe happened, is much clearer. Many Israelis think that the Pales-
tinians declined the most generous offer Israel ever made or is likely to
make in the future. This rejection, coupled with the Intifada, demonstrates
that the Palestinians never truly accepted Israel's right to exist securely as a
Jewish state, 4 6 and their violent response to the extended hand of then
Prime Minister Ehud Barak underscores their duplicity and bad faith. 4 7
The political result is that the majority of Israelis who supported the peace-
process and accepted the "land for peace" principle are disillusioned, while
the minority who opposed the process feel vindicated and grow in strength.
Palestinians feel that the Camp David summit was oblivious to their
most basic need: the creation of the State of Palestine on all the land lost in
1967. Moreover, offering them a deal they could not accept placed them
again in the position of the culprit, thereby demonstrating an American-
Israeli conspiracy to de-legitimize their position. The harsh Israeli reaction
to the Intifada during its early days did little to calm their frustration. 48
From their perspective, the hungry wolf who put on the mantle of a peace-
ful lamb revealed its true identity: an oppressive colonial power to be right-
fully and forcefully resisted by all means.4 9 Thus, on both sides of the
conflict, disappointment replaced hope, and groups that opposed the peace
process, previously relegated to the radical edges of the political map,
became mainstream.
Opinions diverge as to the root causes of the al-Aqsa Intifada and, con-
sequently, on the best method of ending the ever-mounting cycle of vio-
lence. Many Israelis believe Chairman Arafat orchestrated it, both to
pressure Israel into concessions he could not achieve politically at Camp
REV. BOOKS, Aug. 9, 2001, at 59; Gilead Sher, The Brink of Peace? An Inside Look from
Camp David to Taba, 318 PEACEWATCH, April 18, 2001, available at http://www.washing
toninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.htm.
45. As two of the participants in the Camp David summit observed: "Had there
been, in hindsight, a generous Israeli offer? Ask a member of the American team, and an
honest answer might be that there was a moving target of ideas, fluctuating impressions
of the deal that the US [sic] could sell to the two sides, a work in progress that reacted
(and therefore was vulnerable) to the pressures and persuasion of both. Ask Barak and
he might volunteer that there was no Israeli offer and, besides, Arafat rejected it. Ask
Arafat, and the response you might hear is that there was no offer; besides, it was unac-
ceptable; that said, it had better remain on the table." See Malley & Agha, supra note 44,
at 65.
46. When the issue of finding a solution to the Palestinian refugees' problem was
translated into a demand for a right of return, most Jews in Israel felt that this very idea
was designed to bring the existence of Israel as a Jewish state to an end.
47. This conclusion was further fueled by the Intifada's rhetoric and its acts. See
ICG Report, supra note 32, at 8-9.
48. Use of heavy military means against demonstrators, lethal crowd control and
dispersion methods resulted in a death-toll of 5 Palestinian dead and about 200 injured
on the first day of the Intifada, on September 28, 2000. See STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra
note 3. Demonstrations that followed throughout the territories and Israel were sup-
pressed with force, resulting, within five days, in 35 Palestinians killed and over 1000
Palestinian injured. See id at 5
49. See ICG Report, supra note 32, at 9-10.
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David, and to divert the political ramification of Camp David's failure.
According to this analysis, to engage in negotiations seeking a political
solution amidst terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians rewards terrorism.
Israel elected Prime Minister Sharon who supported the idea that security
is necessary for any political move. 50 Many Palestinians, however, see the
Intifada as a spontaneous response to a series of events and to an accumu-
lation of frustration, culminating in the provocative visit of Sharon to Tem-
ple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. 5 l Israeli heavy-handed dealing with the
popular outburst further fueled anger and generated the complete dis-
enchantment of a younger generation of Palestinians with the peace-pro-
cess and encouraged their willingness to engage in an all-out war with
Israel, including the development of the cult of martyrdom. 5 2 According to
this analysis, in the absence of a political process pointing to a genuine
solution entailing the end of the long occupation, the Intifada will continue
and Israel will know no security. Indeed, ever since the Intifada began, 401
civilians have been the victims of Palestinian attacks. 53 Indeed, the now
commonplace method of suicide bombing in crowded public places within
Israel generates a deep sense of personal insecurity affecting daily life, and
anger which translates into political support for a tough response. Israel's
reactions include the destruction of Palestinian security facilities; frequent
use of targeted state killings of suspected perpetrators of violence; ever-
tighter closures around Palestinians locations; aerial bombardments and
ground invasions to refugee camps in Operation "Defensive Shield"; and
the military re-occupation of the territories from which Israel had previ-
ously withdrawn, in Operation "Decisive Road."5 4 While these moves were
not productive in terms of either security or peace, they did succeed in
virtually incapacitating the Palestinian Authority's ability to service the Pal-
50. Id. at 9
51. Id. at 6-7; see also MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 34, at 5, (finding the lntifada to
be the result of immediate and structural frustrations that could not be said to have been
pre-meditated nor due to a determinant factor).
52. The notion that sacrificing one's life at the altar of national security is, of course,
an ethos common to all armies since time immemorial. Yet the cult of martyrdom devel-
oped by Islamic groups in general and Palestinian groups in particular is quite distinct.
See Roxanne L. Euben, Killing (For) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom and Political Action, 30
POL. THEORY 4 (2002).
53. This is the number of Israeli civilians killed according to B'TsELEM, supra note 4.
According to IDF statistics, 451 Israeli civilians were killed and 3,330 wounded. See
supra note 4.
54. Both Operation Decisive Road and its predecessor, Operation Defensive Shield,
have received massive support by the Israeli Jewish population. See Ephraim Ya'ar &
Tamar Herman, 80% of theJews in Israel Support Operation "Decisive Road", Knowing that
the Goal is Prolonged Occupation, HA'ARETZ, July 7, 2002, at C2. In a poll conducted by
The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research between June 25-27, 2002, it was found
that 80% of the Jewish interviewees support the IDF re-entry into Palestinian towns
knowing full well that the stated objective is to remain there for an indefinite period,
though the majority does not believe that the re-occupation will bring an end to Palestin-
ian suicide bombing in the long run. See id. This is a clear shift in positions when
compared to a poll conducted in October 2001, following a re-entry of the IDF into some
Palestinian towns, where only 25% favored the IDF's presence in Area A for an indefinite
period. See id.
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estinian population, and its security services' ability to control internal
dynamics and militant groups. 55 It is members of these groups whom
Israel targets for liquidation.
D. The Targets
The first victim of the Israeli policy of targeted liquidation was an activist
of Tanzim/Fatah. In the statement confirming his assassination and declar-
ing it to be in execution of a reasoned policy, the Spokesman for the I.D.F.
further identified the targets: activists belonging to "groups responsible for
the current escalation of violence."' 56 A review of the case studies con-
ducted by human rights organizations 57 reveals that the targeted liquida-
tions usually occur in Area A, and that the targets included members of
three main groups: Tanzim/Fatah; Hamas; and Islamic Jihad.58 These
groups do attack Israelis, but due to differences in their political agendas,
they differed until recently, in their targets, their methods, and their affilia-
tion and compliance with the Palestinian Authority.
Fatah, headed by Arafat, is the dominant political force of the Palestin-
ian Authority. Tanzim is Fatah's military wing. 59 Thus, Fatah/Tanzim con-
siders itself bound by the Oslo Agreement and the PLO's recognition of
Israel. Consequently, its activities in the current Intifada concentrate on
both Israeli soldiers and civilians in the occupied territories, but not in
Israel. 60 The method most commonly used in these attacks is deliberate
shooting at cars with Israeli number plates. 6 1 The Organization hardly ever
55. For a brief review of these dynamics, see ICG Report, supra note 32, at 9-10. The
Palestinian Authority's ability to exercise control over area A following almost two years
of closures, economic collapse, and recent massive military operations and re-occupa-
tion is dubious to say the least. The leader of the Tanzim, Marwan Barghuti, made clear,
in an interview with ICG in March 2002, that while the Taizim cooperates with Arafat, it
is within the Tanzim power to decide whether or not, and under what circumstances, to
continue to do so. See ICG Report, supra note 32, at 10. Note, however, that during
Operation Defensive Shield, Israel arrested Barghuti, and he is currently standing trial
before an Israeli criminal court. His appeal contesting the detention's conditions and
interrogation methods was rejected by the HCJ, stating that the inquiry does not present
danger to his health nor is conducted by prohibited methods. The HCJ further found the
order issued by the GSS, preventing Barghuti from meeting his lawyer, to be valid, while
recommending a monitored meeting. Barghuti's lawyer rejected the recommendation.
See H.C. 4016/02, Barghuti v. State of Israel (Judgment of May 14, 2002, not yet pub-
lished; on file with authors).
56. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57. STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3, at 9-17; LA\ Appeal, supra note 11, at 9-12.
58. There are a few other radical military organizations based in the Palestinian
Authority, which carry out attacks against Israelis. These include the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine (DFLP), as well as a few new groups whose identity is less clear. To these should be
added a few individuals with no apparent organizational affiliation. See ANINESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, BROKEN LIVES - A YEAR OF INTIFADA, 41 (2001) [hereinafter BROKEN Livis). The
PFLP's military wing is the Abu 'Ali Mustafa Brigades, which claimed responsibility for
the murder of Israel's Tourism Minister, Rehavam Ze'evi in October 2001. See WITHOUT
DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 14.
59. WITHOUT DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 10.
60. ICG Report, supra note 32, at 9-10; BROKEN LIVES, supra note 58, at 41-42.
61. WITHOUT DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 10.
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claims responsibility for any direct killings of Israelis, but it does not deny
the targeting of settlers in drive-by shootings. The degree to which Chair-
man Arafat controls the Tanzim is unclear and alters according to the pre-
vailing political situation: sometimes his call for a cease-fire is heeded and
sometimes not.6 2 The Intifada generated an intense internal political strug-
gle within the Palestinian Authority, characterized by a rise in power of a
younger generation of activists, mainly affiliated with the Tanzim, who
reportedly control the street, initially at the expense of both the traditional
leadership and of the more radical Islamic groups. 63 At the same time, the
cycle of violence radicalized the Tanzim. An illustrative example of this
process is the formation of a new organization, affiliated with the Tanzim/
Fatah, known as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which, in addition to partici-
pating in attacks against Israelis in the occupied territories, also partici-
pates in suicide bombing in Israel. 64
In addition, members of two radical Islamic groups that oppose the
peace process, Harnas and IslamicJihad, are the main targets of Israel's pol-
icy of liquidation. These groups, which deny Israel's right to exist and
condemn the Oslo concessions, use bombs, and often suicide bombers,
targeted at Israeli civilians, usually in crowded public places within
Israel.6 5
The control Chairman Arafat used to have over these groups prior to,
and in the early days of, the Intifada is also indeterminate. What is known
is that Israel called on the Palestinian Authority to arrest individuals alleg-
edly involved in the killing of Israelis, at times publicly stating the names
of those it wanted arrested, 6 6 and that the Palestinian authority rarely car-
ried out any proper investigations into these killings and hardly ever
arrested any suspects. On the exceptional occasion when the Palestinian
Authority made arrests, the suspects were released within hours or, at
most, days. 6 7 Israel maintains that "targeted killing" is a consequence of
the Palestinian Authority's failure to carry out its obligation to arrest such
people.6 8 What is also evident is that as the violence escalated, and Israel's
retaliatory attacks incapacitated the Palestinian Authority and its security
62. BROKEN LIVES, supra note 58, at 41-2.
63. ICG Report, supra note 32, at 4, 9-10.
64. Id. at 9-10. The affiliation of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade to the Fatah is not at all
clear and there are conflicting views as to whether the group is controlled by the Fatah.
See WITHOUT DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 11-12.
65. For example, the August 2000 bombing of the Sbarro Pizzeria in Jerusalem,
where a total of 16 people, including 7 children, were killed and over 100 injured. The
attack was carried out by a suicide bomber who was a member of the Hamas armed
wing, the Izz al-din al Qassam Brigades. The Hamas also claimed responsibility for the
June 2001 suicide bombing outside a disco near the Dolphinarium in Tel-Aviv, which
killed 21 people, mainly young immigrants from the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and the suicide bombing in March 2002 during Passover night in Park Hotel,
Netanya, which killed 25 people.
66. BROKEN LIVES, supra note 58, at 42.
67. Id.
68. For instance, on August 5, 2001 the Israeli Minister of Defense publicly named
seven suspects wanted by Israel for bomb attacks, asked the Palestinian authority to
arrest them, and indicated that the IDF would push ahead with its policy of "killing the
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services, the likelihood of any real enforcement action on the part of the
Palestinian Authority against members of such groups is basically nil, and
the rapprochement between these three groups, with a more radicalized
Tanzim intent on using force against a common enemy, has grown. 69
Individuals often provide significant insights into understanding gen-
eral shifts in mindsets. One such individual is Marwan Barghoutti, the
leader of the Tanzim, whom Israel captured during operation Defensive
Shield, and who presently stands trial before an Israeli criminal court.70
Barghoutti was an avid supporter of the Oslo process, committed to the
elimination of the occupation, not of Israelis. This man transformed from
a peace-activist into a leader of a violent resistance, and then into a full-
fledged terrorist because apparently he found it difficult to understand
"why should you feel secure in Tel-Aviv when we do not feel secure in
Ramallah?" 7 1 His change tells the story of the radicalization of the Palestin-
ian street. The comment made by a minister in the Israeli government, that
Barghoutti should not be put on trial but rather "taken to a forest and shot
in the head," 72 tells the story of the radicalization of the Israeli public.
Two additional points are to be made in this context: first, since the
early days of both the Intifada and the Israeli policy of targeted killings, the
IDF arrested hundreds of suspects in Area A. 73 Second, even after its cur-
rent re-occupation of Area A, a situation likely to be long-term, 7 4 Israel
continues to exercise its policy of targeted liquidations. 7 5 These points
raise three questions: first, what is the degree of the de facto jurisdiction
the Palestinian Authority exercises over Area A vis-a-vis the de facto control
exercised by the I.D.F., even following its withdrawal from this territory?
Second, why does Israel reject the viable alternatives to targeted liquida-
tions-arrests? Third, what is the significance of killings carried out by an
Occupying Power in the territories it occupies?
terrorist and their leaders." See id. The Palestinian Authority arrested the Hamas activ-
ists, but later released them without initiating judicial processes. Id. at 42.
69. For instance, there are indications that the Islamic Jihad is providing financial
assistance to the al-Aqsa Brigades. See ICG Report, supra note 32, at 10.
70. See supra note 55.
71. Gidon Levy, Listen to Barghouti, HA'ARETZ, Apr. 21, 2002, at BI.
72. See Gal, supra note 26.
73. B'TSELEM, supra note 4.
74. Ben Aluf, The Prime Minister: We Shall Stay in the Palestinian Cities a Long Time,
HA'ARETZ, July 4, 2002, at A4.
75. On July 1, 2002, the IDF's maritime commando killed Muhamed Tahar who was
the head of the military wing of the Hamas in Area A and "the Number One suspect" in
the West Bank. See Amos Har'el, The IDF and the Security Services Are No Longer Search-
ing for the No. I Suspect, HA'ARETZ, July 4, 2002, at Al. It has further been reported in
the Israeli press that with Operation Decisive Road the IDF has achieved the "somewhat
bizarre though probably temporary situation" where there is no longer a "Number One
suspect," as most have been either killed or arrested. See id. The consequences of this
development are that the priorities of the "targeted state killing policy" have changed:
the chase henceforth would be less personal and directed more at people about whom
there is information that they plan suicide bombing, and less at people in leadership
positions within Palestinian organizations. See id. Indeed, a few weeks later, on July 22,
2002, a new "number one suspect," Salah Shehada, was identified and killed. See infra
notes 278-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two incidents.
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E. The Off-shoots
In pursuit of its targets, Israel uses a variety of military means, most com-
monly, shooting missiles from helicopters;7 6 explosive loads; 7 7 sniper
fire;78 short-range shooting; 79 and, at times, artillery shooting.80 Bystand-
ers are often killed as well. 8 ' In the reified language of war and law, their
deaths are "collateral damage." These data question the accuracy of the
"targeted" or "pinpointed" liquidations, and raise the legal problem of
proportionality.
F. The Justification
All official confirmations of specific targeted state killings mention the
past actions attributed to the target, but they neither specify what actions
that target allegedly planned to take nor contain evidence of the immediate
danger thereby presented.82 At the same time, both the term used in
Hebrew to describe the liquidation, "pinpointed preemptive actions," and
general official comments on the policy, imply that each liquidation pre-
vented a terrorist attack on Israeli civilians, underscoring the necessity and
justification for action.8 3
The policy of targeted state killings is a security policy. As such, there
is no public review of the evidence used to decide who will be targeted.
Nor is evidence provided for review after decision and execution.8 4 Indeed,
while it is reasonable to assume that the military has specific guidelines
used to make these decisions, as well as intelligence information establish-
ing the link between the person and terror activities, past and planned, it is
also reasonable to assume that the Chief Legal Attorney for the IDF
reviewed these guidelines. But it is crucial that such guidelines be publicly
articulated and that specific decisions, and their execution in particular, be
subject to judicial review. 8 5 It is not enough to create a psychological con-
76. Examples of those killed using this medium are Hussein Muhammad Salim
'Abayat, and Jamal 'Abd a-Rahman Muhammad Mansour. B'TSELEM, Assassinations-
Extra Judicial Executions at http://www.btselem.org.
77. Examples of those killed using this medium are Ayman Halawa and 'Abd a-
Rahman Sa'id Hamed. Id.
78. An example of a victim killed using this medium is Dr. Thabet Thabet, STATE
ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3, at 16-17. See discussion infra notes 280-82 and accompa-
nying text. Another example is the assassination of Hani Hussein Abu Baqra. Id. at 13.
79. An example of a victim killed using this medium is Jamal 'Abd al-Qader Hassan
'Abd a-Razzek. Id. at 10-11. Another example is the assassination of Mahmud al-
Madani. B'TsELEM, supra note 76.
80. An example of a victim killed using this medium is Suffian Arada. LAW Appeal,
supra note 11, at 11.
81. For a detailed list see B'TSELEM, supra note 76.
82. See LAw Appeal, supra note 11, at 5. This point is based on the statements made
by the spokesman of the IDF and on media interviews with the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Defense.
83. Presumably, reference to the past misdeeds of the target assumes that individual
will continue to do what he has done unless he is eliminated.
84. LAw Appeal, supra note 11, at 16.
85. This approach is consistent with the HCJ jurisprudence on the justiciability of
security polices. Thus, in the Hess case the court justified its decision to subject the
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nection in the public mind between every killing and the prevention of a
horrific terrorist attack. While this connection explains the widespread,
uncritical support for said policy, it does not provide the necessary legal
justification for the action and, indeed, underscores the need for judicial
review.8 6 A democracy, as a matter of principle, cannot issue a license to
kill as a matter of policy.
8 7
G. Torn Between Two Narratives: From Political Context to Legal Texts
Mucky realities have a tendency to mock legal aesthetics, frustrating any
attempt to arrest their chaotic havoc in static taxonomies and to confine
them to clearly delineated, traditional categories. Targeted state killings
take place amidst-and give expression to-an intricate, violent political
context, the al-Aqsa Intifada. This context is subject to starkly different,
competing narratives. There may be some common denominators in these
narratives but they do not provide a common horizon; a meta-narrative
that can point to a way out of the cycle of violence. Targeted killings and
suicide bombing thus signify the excess of both power and powerlessness.
IDF's open-fire instructions to judicial review on the following ground: "We are faced
with particular instructions concerning the behavior of an armed soldier under circum-
stances which may require an immediate reaction, without the possibility of seeking
advice regarding the proper way of implementing the instructions once certain circum-
stances have occurred. This issue deserves-from a normative perspective, from an
institutional perspective, and from both as a seamless whole-a judicial determination,
and on this matter I see eye to eye with my esteemed colleague, justice Goldberg, that
one should not precondition such a deliberation on the prior existence of concrete cir-
cumstances of causing death or violating an instruction, in order to determine the ques-
tion before us." Hess case, supra note 8, at 816.
86. A government's decision to deprive people of the most basic human right, espe-
cially as it enjoys uncritical public and parliamentary support, requires the judiciary to
actively engage in reviewing it in light of existing norms, thereby pouring into the sepa-
ration of powers principle the very content it was designed to have. The long-term
impact of such a decision may well be the free reign of power unchecked by law. It is the
balance between the three branches of government which, by design, is intended to pre-
vent this result. A court of law that declines to decide on such an issue does not advance
this balance. In fact, the invocation of the doctrine of non-justiciability, ostensibly in the
name of respecting the balance between the three branches of government, is precisely a
decision that sacrifices this balance, and the Court's own raison d'etre at the altar of
raison d'etat. The organization of democratic governments is not an end in itself. The
separation of the three branches of the democratic government is a means to allow it to
walk the tightrope between competing demands without losing its balance and falling.
These demands require it to balance the will of the majority and the protection of minor-
ities, security and liberty, and, in certain situations, to fight against terror and protect
human rights. That balance is also secured by a judiciary, which reviews the legality of
the other branches of government. In so doing the Court does not substitute its political
preference for that of the government. It merely informs the latter of the legal limita-
tions to its power and, in so doing, may indeed contribute to, rather than detract from,
the quality of the government's decisions.
87. Neither can such a license be legitimized by the laws of war. While principally
permitting the targeting of enemy combatants, the corpus of the laws of war further
contains balancing principles such as humanity, necessity, and proportionality, accord-
ing to which the legality of such operations should be determined. See discussion infra
Part 111.4.2. The permissibility of these operations is further limited by the law of occu-
pation. See discussion infra part IV.
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Law, much like force, can neither compensate for this lack of shared
narrative nor substitute for wise statesmanship, but it does not necessarily
follow that law is irrelevant. Law, unlike force, has or "wishes to have a
formal existence,"8 8 and the autonomy it maintains may assist policy-mak-
ers and their constituencies in finding a way out of their psychological cul-
de-sac.
Within which normative framework is the policy of targeted state kill-
ings to be placed? The discussion of the political and operational context
offered in this Section suggests more questions than answers. These ques-
tions pertain to the following issues:
(a) Applicable Legal Regime: It is unclear whether the situation constitutes a
full-fledged armed conflict, as Israel maintains, and if so, whether the armed
conflict is an international armed conflict. 8 9 It is equally unclear whether
Israel remained the Occupying Power in Area A when it withdrew from that
territory; whether that withdrawal was genuine or merely a ruse (as the
Palestinians claim); whether the Palestinian Authority, ever since the begin-
ning of the Intifada, could properly exercise its jurisdiction and function to
provide civilian and security services, or does Israel have true control of the
area, as indicated by arrests it made even prior to its recent military re-occu-
pation of Area A? What, indeed, are the implications of the current military
re-occupation of the territories regarding the status of the parties and in
light of Israel's policy of targeted state killings? What is the relevance of
Human Rights Law in the context of the Laws of War and in the context of
Humanitarian Law?90 These questions generate more ambiguities, indicated
in (b) and (c) below.
(b) Legal Status of the Targets: The status of the people targeted for assassi-
nation is unclear. Are they combatants engaged in a war; civilians whose
protected status should be respected by an Occupying Power; civilians who
lost their protected status; or a special kind of hybrid that fails to comforta-
bly fit into any existing category, and therefore bereft of any status?9 '
(c) Legal Parameters for Determining the Legality of Targeted State Killings as
Applied to (a) and (b): It is not enough to place the policy of targeted state
killings within an applicable normative framework and to reconcile that
framework with the status of the targeted people because more intricate
questions may present themselves. Are the people targeted for liquidation,
even assuming that they are responsible for horrific terrorist actions against
civilians, deprived of their human rights? Can their guilt be assumed, rather
than determined by verifiable proof? Are arrests, rather than liquidation, of
suspects an indication of the existence of a viable alternative to targeted kill-
ings? If so, what is the legal significance of the existence of such an alterna-
tive? Do the methods and means used support the position that the
liquidations are indeed "pinpointed"?9 2
88. See Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW
159 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993) (arguing that the law's success lies in
its formalism: it assimilates extralegal concerns into its own categories and fashions its
autonomy out of the very material it rhetorically discards in the name of that autonomy).
89. See discussion infra Part 111.2.1
90. See discussion infra Part 111.2.3.
91. See discussion infra Part 111.3.1.
92. See discussion infra Part 111.4.
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These questions must be resolved in order to determine the legality or
illegality of targeted state killings. Section III below addresses these issues.
II. The Normative Framework: A Legal Analysis of Targeted Killings
A. General
Essentially, three fields of international law may be relevant to the case at
hand: human rights law, 93 the laws of war (the law of The Hague) 9 4 and
humanitarian law (the law of Geneva), 9 5 especially the rules of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. 96
Note, however, that while such a delimitation is necessary, it is also a
somewhat fictitious exercise because it is difficult to contain intricate reali-
ties within sharply defined legal categories. The rationale for the classifica-
tion of the relevant law into these three fields is quite distinct if not
altogether contradictory. 9 7 Human rights law equally protects all people at
all times,98 while humanitarian law protects some people, namely protected
93. As codified in customary international law and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 175, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
94. The term pertains to a series of conventions from 1868 to 1907. See e.g., Decla-
ration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes
Weight, Saint Petersburg, Nov. 29 (Dec. 11), 1868, reprinted in THE LAW OF WAR: DocU-
MENTED HISTORY 192 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972); Hague Convention No. 11 with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed Regulations, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Hague Convention No. II Relative to the Opening of Hostilities,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538; Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land with annexed Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV]. See also JEAN PICTET, DEVEL-
OPMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-58 (1985); FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIES-
BETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 19-25 (3rd ed. 2001).
95. "The law of Geneva" refers primarily to the four conventions signed in Geneva in
1949. See First Geneva Convention, infra note 213; Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 28. See also KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 94, at 25-29.
96. These terms are used somewhat arbitrarily, since, as explained below, the Hague
and Geneva laws are considered inseparable, thus forming "one single complex system,
known today as international humanitarian law." See Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 256 [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons]. These terms, however, serve to emphasize the difference between the various
provisions of the two frameworks.
97. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239,
240 ("To speak of the humanization of humanitarian law or the law of war is thus in
many way a contradiction in terms.").
98. Id. Although certain rights are subject to derogation during times of national
emergency, the most basic human rights, such as the right to life, are nonetheless safe-
guarded regardless of the circumstances. See ICCPR, supra note 93, at art. 4; see also
JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATE OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992).
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persons, some of the time (during armed conflicts and occupation), 99 while
the law of war concerns itself primarily with the regulation of belligerent
conduct during warfare. 0 0 Having made these distinctions, note that cur-
rent perspectives seem to emphasize the common teleological basis of all
three fields, namely, the maximization of the protection of physical integ-
rity and human dignity.'t ' In particular, the distinction between the
Hague law and the Geneva law is considered obsolete 10 2 in light of their
integration into the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conven-
tions (AP 1).103
We submit that any attempt to analyze the issue of targeted killings
from the perspective of merely one applicable field of law will provide
neither a comprehensive, nor accurate answer to the question of its legality.
An adequate answer requires a combined perspective.' 0 4 This article
addresses this issue in the following manner: subsection two, The Legal
Regime, details the conditions of applicability of these three fields of inter-
national law; subsection three, A Matter of Status, discusses the subjects to
which each field applies; subsection four, The Relevant Provisions, applies
the relevant provisions in each field to the question at hand.
99. Thomas J. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the Humanitarian Law of the
Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1997, 103 MiL. L. REV. 3, 1 -12
(1984).
100. PICTET, supra note 94, at 49; MajorJohn Embry Parkerson, Jr., United States Com-
pliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MI..
L. REV. 31, 34 (1991).
101. Human rights law has contributed to the inclusion in the Geneva conventions
and protocols the prohibitions on torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment
or punishment, and arbitrary arrest or detention and discrimination. See Meron, supra
note 966, at 266. The law of war and humanitarian law are both aimed at minimizing
the suffering caused by armed conflicts; humanitarian considerations have introduced,
inter alia, the principles of proportionality and necessity into the law of war. See LESLIE
C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 328 (1993). The acknowledge-
ment of military necessities is apparent in humanitarian instruments, which allow for
less extensive safeguards on human rights during armed conflicts. See discussion infra
Part 111.4.2.
102. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 96, at 256.
103. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 75(4)(c),
1125 U.S.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol 11
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
104. Interestingly enough, the question of targeted assassinations has not been
examined in such a context in international law literature thus far. Emphasis was placed
on the questions of a State's right to self defense on the one hand, and of the prohibition
of treacherous killing on the other hand. See Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by
Attacking the Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights
Versus the State's Right to Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 195 (2001); J.
Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted Killings" Under International Law,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1069 (2002); Louis Rene Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-
Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321 (1991); Lieutenant Commander
Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 134 MIL. L. REV. 123
(1991); Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609 (1992). While acknowledging that under the law of war's
regime the status of the victim is of vital importance, no author, with the exception of
Gross, expounds on the subject nor discusses the issue from the perspective of human
rights law.
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B. The Legal Regime: The Conditions of Applicability of the Laws of
War; Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
It is necessary to examine the conditions that trigger the application of
each of the three fields of international law.
1. The Law of War
The modern laws of war stemmed from European states in the nineteenth
century concerned about the escalating severity of wars.' 0 5 They devel-
oped through a series of conferences, conventions, and declarations from
1856 to 1907.106 Their goal was to reduce the suffering of war and to
strengthen good relations between belligerent States.)0 7 These rules are
well rooted in customary international law:
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable
in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person
and "elementary considerations of humanity". . . that the Hague and Geneva
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental
rules are to be observed by all states whether or not they have ratified the
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible
principles of international customary law. 0 8
As warfare changed, however, so too did perceptions of war. It ceased
to be the sovereign prerogative of belligerent states, waged in their exclusive
domain. Indeed, most modern hostilities involve non-state actors and the
nature and intensity of conflicts vary greatly. 10 9 Accordingly, some argued
that the Hague law should apply to various types of armed conflicts that
do not constitute "war" in its traditional sense.11 0 Yet given the discrep-
ancy between what the law should be and what it is, and the distinction
between international and non-international conflicts, remained, with the
ensuing differences in applicable law. How a given conflict is defined is
therefore important. There are two aspects to this definition: First, is the
conflict international or non-international? Second, does the situation
amount to an "armed conflict"?
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions defines a conflict as
international when it is waged between two or more States. According to
105. See KAI.SHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 94, at 12-15.
106. See GREEN, supra note 101, at 27-51 (describing the development of the law of
war).
107. Id. at 30.
108. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 96, at 257. The Court
noted that the humanitarian rules included in the regulations annexed to the Hague
Convention No. IV were held by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal to be of
customary status. Id. at 258; International Military Tribunal, Trials of the Major War
Criminals 253-54 (1947).
109. INGRID DETTER, THE LAV OF WAR 18 (2d ed. 2000).
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 97 (Oct. 2,
1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm [herein-
after Tadic Appeal]; see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'I. L. 554, 561 (1995) (referring to the rationale underlying the
imposition of individual criminal liability for crimes committed during a non-interna-
tional armed conflict).
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,"' all other conflicts are
non-international. In an effort to adapt the rules to changing realities, arti-
cle 1(4) of AP I broadened the traditional definition of international con-
flict to incorporate "conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination, .... " thus equating the status of, and the
protection accorded to, national liberation movements with that accorded
to States. 112 This change was instituted with the then Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization in mind, 113 which is precisely why both Israel and the
United States refused to join AP I.114 Unlike most parts of the Protocol,
which essentially codified existing norms of customary international law,
art. 1(4) generated much controversy. Consequently, it cannot be regarded
as a customary rule, and it is not applicable to relations between the Pales-
tinian Authority and Israel. 1" 5 This analysis generates the conclusion that
the legal characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has to rely on
the customary definition, rendering it non-international.116
The definition of a conflict as an "armed conflict" varies according to
whether it is characterized as international or non-international. In the
international sphere, an "armed conflict" is "any difference arising
111. Article 3 is the only provision in the Geneva Conventions pertaining to non-
international armed conflicts. The scope of protection it affords to victims of non-inter-
national armed conflict is very limited. It only protects persons who are not taking part
in the hostilities, who have laid down their arms, or who are hors du combat. See Rose-
mary Abi-Saab, Humanitarian Law and Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Concern,
in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 209, 217 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
112. Leslie. C. Green, International Regulation of Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 355, 373-74 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d. ed. 1999).
113. Michel Veuthey, Non-International Armed Conflict and Guerilla Warfare, in INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 417, 425 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d. ed. 1999); DETTER, supra
note 109, at 1.
114. Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Proto-
col 1, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 683 (1994); Kendall, supra note 104, at 9.
115. Cf. U.N. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Question of the Violation of Human Rights
in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/8 (2002).
116. It should, however, be noted that another analysis is possible: insofar as the Pal-
estinian Authority possesses all the characteristics of a state enumerated in the Monte-
video Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, it may be argued that the conflict
conforms to the traditional definition of an international one. See Montevideo Conven-
tion on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165
L.N.T.S. 19; see also REST. (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1987) (providing a definition of statehood); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-7 (5th ed. 1998). Still, the U.N. Inquiry Commission estab-
lished by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to investigate violations of human
rights and humanitarian law in the Palestinian territories was of the opinion that the
conflict is indeed of a non-international nature: "Clearly, there is no international
armed conflict in the region, as Palestine, despite widespread recognition, still falls short
of the accepted criteria of statehood." U.N. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Question of the
Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine-
Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission Established Pursuant to Commission
Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/
121 (2001) [hereinafter Human Rights Commission Report].
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between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces .... It
makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter
takes place."' 17 A substantially higher threshold, however, is set in a non-
international context. Thus, while even an isolated event can be regarded
as an armed conflict between two States, only hostilities that are similar to
an international war, for example, when armed forces on either side are
engaged, can a non-international conflict be defined as an "armed con-
flict."' "I This standard was considered necessary to distinguish an armed
conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or ter-
rorist activities, which are arguably within the domestic concern of the
states.1 19
Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via (ICTY) held that a non-international armed conflict exists when there
is "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organ-
ized armed groups.' 120 It further defined this standard as incorporating a
certain degree of intensity, and certain standards pertaining to the military
organization of the parties to the conflict.' 2' The ICRC Commentary to
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention provides criteria for the iden-
tification of "organized armed groups." According to the ICRC, this kind of
group possesses an organized military force under responsible command;
has possession over part of the national territory; exercises de facto author-
ity over persons within that part of the territory; purports to have the char-
acteristics of a State; agrees to be bound by the provisions of the
Conventions; to confront it, a recourse to its regular military forces is
needed by the opposed Government; that Government either recognized
the revolting party as belligerents or claimed to itself the right of a belliger-
ent. 122 The Commentary specifically stipulates that these criteria "are not
obligatory and are only mentioned as an indication."'123 Thus, the Inter-
117. COMMENTARY, THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION 01 THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 Ulean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter COMMEN-
TARY OF THE FIRST CONVENTION].
118. COMMENTARY, THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION
OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 33 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1960).
119. COMMENTARY OF THE FIRST CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 49-50; Juan Carlos
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V./
11.95, doc. 7 rev. 271 para. 151 (1997) [hereinafter Tablada case].
120. Tadic Appeal, supra note 110, para. 70. The definition was later incorporated in
article 8(2)() of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 8(2)(f), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
121. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 562 (May 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Tadic Judgment].
122. COMMENTARY OF THE FIRST CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 49-50.
123. Id. at 50. Most of these criteria were adopted by article 1 of Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), July 8, 1977, art. 6(2)(c), 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP 11], thus making them obligatory, and according to some
views, render the scope of application of the Protocol very limited indeed. Leslie C.
Green, Strengthening Legal Protection in Internal Conflicts: Low-Intensity Conflict and the
Law, 3 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 493, 505-506 (1997). George H. Aldrich, The Laws of
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American Commission on Human Rights set a lower threshold for the
applicability of Common Article 3:
"It is important to understand that application of Common Article 3 does
not require the existence of large-scale and generalized hostilities or a situa-
tion comparable to a civil war in which dissident armed groups exercise
control over parts of national territory." 124
The Commission focused, instead, on the nature of the hostile acts
and the level of the violence exercised in a given event, holding that a care-
fully planned, coordinated and executed attack by an organized armed
group against a military base, confronted by military action, constituted an
armed attack, its short duration notwithstanding. 125
In light of the elastic criteria mentioned above, arguably the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict qualifies as an armed conflict to which the laws of war
should apply. There can be little doubt that the Palestinian Authority qual-
ifies as an "organized armed group." The Palestinian Authority, far from
resembling an unorganized insurrection group, is as close to a State as an
entity can be. It is the undisputed leader of the Palestinian people, retaining
control over the Palestinian population and, at least until the recent reoc-
cupation of the territories, it exercised control over most of the Palestinian
designated territory, especially the "A" territories. 126 Note that while only
the Tanzim Organization is officially affiliated to the Palestinian Author-
ity, 12 7 all other military organizations operating in the Palestinian territo-
ries are united by the same goals of self-determination and compose a
united front of resistance. 12 8 These groups are highly organized, 1 29 thus
fulfilling the condition of "organized military force under responsible com-
mand." There can also be little doubt as to the severity of the conflict, as
indicated by the high number of casualties and the massive use of arms on
both sides. Finally, the conflict has been ever-present on the agenda of the
United Nations Security Council.1 3 0 It is therefore safe to conclude that
the conflict is more than mere "unorganized insurrections, or terrorist
War on Land, 94 AJ.I.L. 42, 60 (2000). AP 11, however, is not controlling in this situa-
tion, as Israel is not a party to it.
124. Tablada case, supra note 119, 31 152. Such a low threshold, it has been sug-
gested, was also set in the definition proposed by the ICTY, since no requirements for
territorial control, or that the government be forced to employ its armed forces, or recog-
nize the insurgents as belligerents, were set. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAl
ARMED CONFLICT 43 (2002).
125. Tablada case, supra note 119, 31 155-56.
126. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
127. WITHOUT DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 10; see also supra notes 59-64 and accom-
panying text.
128. WITHOUT DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 4, 10-15; see also discussion supra Part
11.4.
129. WITHOUT DISTINCTION, supra note 4, at 10-15.
130. See e.g., S.C. Res. 1405, U.N. SCOR, 4516th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1405 (2002);
S.C. Res. 1403, U.N. SCOR, 4506th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1403 (2002); S.C. Res. 1402,
U.N. SCOR, 4503rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1402 (2002); S.C. Res. 1397, U.N. SCOR,
4489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (2002); S.C. Res. 1322, U.N. SCOR, 4205th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (2000).
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activities" and is a full-scale "armed conflict," even under the harshest of
terms. The law of war clearly should be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.131 The laws of war, however, do not represent the only corpus of
law applicable to the situation.
2. Humanitarian Law
This subsection focuses on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, the primary source of humanitarian law regulating the treatment of a
population in an occupied territory, in the context of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
The Fourth Geneva Convention applies, as between the Contracting
Parties, to persons who, either during an armed conflict or during an occu-
pation, find themselves in the hands of a party to the Convention of which
they are not nationals. 13 2 The term "in the hands of' relates, according to
the Tadic case, to a situation in which the occupying party has effective
control over an area, and for the whole duration such control is actually
exercised.t 33 Indeed, a territory is considered occupied only when it is
actually under the effective control of an occupant and extends only to
those areas over which he is actually able to exercise such control. 134 The
underlying assumption is that there exists no authority, other than that of
the occupant in the area. 13 5 The existence of such an authority in an area
within the occupied territory has no bearing on the state of occupation if
that area is surrounded and cut-off from the rest of the occupied terri-
tory. 13 6 Effective control of the occupant is measured by his ability to
assume the responsibilities that attach to an occupying power, namely, the
ability to issue and enforce directives to the inhabitants of the territory. 137
131. The U.N. Inquiry Commission was inclined to the view that "sporadic demon-
strations/confrontations often provoked by the killing of demonstrators[,] ... undis-
ciplined lynching[,] ... [and] acts of terrorism in Israel itself and the shooting of
soldiers and settlers on roads leading to settlements by largely unorganized gunmen
cannot amount to protracted armed violence on the part of an organized armed group."
See U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at para. 40. With respect, we find
ourselves unable to concur. As indicated, the various acts of hostilities are performed by
organized military organizations. Further, since the visit of the commission, the hostili-
ties have substantially escalated, both in organization and degree. Under the circum-
stances, rejection of the application of the rules of armed conflict cannot be justified in
light of its underlining rationales. It should be noted that prior to the Peace Process, the
Israeli Supreme Court had accepted the applicability of the Hague Regulations to the
Palestinian territories on the grounds of the control Israel had over them at the time. See
H.C. 393/82, Iscan v. Commander of the IDF in Judea and Samaria, 37(4) P.D. 785, 792.
In recent cases the Court declared the "rules of war" to be applicable to the present
situation. See H.C. 3451/02, Almadani v. Minister of Defense, 56(3) P.D. 30, 34 Iherein-
after Almadani case]; H.C. 3114/02 Barakeh case, supra note 9, at 16.
132. The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 28, at arts. 2, 4. For further discus-
sion see infra section III.C.2.
133. Tadic Judgment at 111 579-81.
134. Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations 1907; GREEN, supra note 102, at 247-48.
135. GREEN, supra note 101, at 247-48.
136. TadfcJudgment at 9 580.
137. THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTs 243 (Dieter Fleck ed.
1995).
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Israel, though a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, denies its
applicability to the occupied territories. Two issues should therefore be
addressed: First, Israel's argument that upon their occurpation, the territo-
ries were not part of the territory of a Contracting Party, and thus the Con-
vention does not apply. Second, given current events, there are questions
about the de facto control presently exercised by Israel over these
territories.
Regarding thc first issue, Israel maintains that the Palestinian territo-
ries, upon their occupation in 1967, were under no sovereignty. Since
common article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention conditions its applica-
bility to an occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, that
applicability is excluded. 138 Israel bases this argument on the fact that Jor-
dan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950 was only recognized by Britain
and Pakistan,' 3 9 and on the fact that Egypt never claimed that the Gaza
Strip was part of its territory. 140 The Israeli position was met with consid-
erable scholarly disagreement, even within Israel, 14 1 and both the General
Assembly 14 2 and the Security Council1 4 3 of the United Nations rejected it.
The counter-arguments rest on textual, analytical, and teleological
grounds. The textual approach differentiates between the first and second
paragraphs of Common Article 2, and relies on the first paragraph to apply
in this situation. According to this view, referring to the terms of the sec-
138. Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Mlitary Government-
The Initial Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTRATED BY ISRAEL
1967-1980 13, 33-34 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982). Art. 2 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 28, states: "In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter
accepts and applies the provisions thereof."
139. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria, 3 IsR. L. REV. 279 (1968).
140. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territo-
ries, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 263 (1971); Stacy Howlett, Palestinian Private Property
Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 117, 153 (2001).
Both Jordan and Egypt are parties to the Fourth Conventions. See note 28 & 96 and
accompanying text.
141. E.g., Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human
Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 107 (1978); ESTHER R. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-1982 51-56 (1985).
142. See e.g., G.A. Res. 32/91, U.N. GAOR, 32nd Sess., 101st plen. mtg. at 69, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/32/91 (1977); G.A. Res. 33/113, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., 87st plen. mtg. at
70, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/113 (1978); G.A. Res. 44/48, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 78st
plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/RES/144/48 (1989).
143. See e.g., S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 1361st mtg. at 5 (1967); S.C. Res. 446, U.N.
SCOR, 2134th mtg. at 4 (1979); S.C. Res. 605, U.N. SCOR, 2777th mtg. at 4 (1987); see
also Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli Occupied Territories Since
1967, 84 A.J.I.L. 44, 69-70 (1990).
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ond paragraph is of limited relevance, since it is the first paragraph that
applies when a belligerent occupation begins during a war, such as in the
present case. 14 4 Support for this contention is found in the ICRC Com-
mentary on Common Article 2 of the Convention.1 4 5  The analytical
approach argues that there can be no vacuum in title. Whether or not the
Jordanian 1948 occupation and subsequent annexation were legal, the
Palestinians allowed the annexation, which combined their sovereignty
with that of Jordan's, the net result being that the territories were taken
from a High Contracting Party.1 4 6 Finally, the teleological approach is
most convincing in its emphasis on the rationale underlying the law of
occupation, that is, to ensure protection for persons no longer under the
control of their own authority, but of that of a foreign occupying power.
Indeed, from the perspective of the residents of the Palestinian territories,
Israel is a foreign occupying power, and therefore these residents should be
accorded the humanitarian protection decreed by the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention. 147 Finally, Israel's position on the de jure applicability of the Con-
vention notwithstanding, it nevertheless declared, prior to the Oslo Accord,
the humanitarian provisions of the Convention to be de facto applicable, 14 8
thereby admitting the validity of the teleological interpretation.
The Peace process possibly altered the realities of occupation. The
division of the territories into jurisdictional areas, and the subsequent
withdrawal of the IDF from most of Area 'A,' 14 9 led to Israel's conclusion
that the transfer of control to the Palestinian Authority excludes the appli-
cability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, at least as far as Area "A" is
concerned.15 0 This contention is quite problematic, especially in light of
recent events, witnessing Israeli forces repeatedly re-entering cities in area
"A," encircling them, imposing curfews,' 5 1 and finally re-occupying
them.1 5 2 Indeed, even prior to the current reoccupation of Area 'A,' these
military operations demonstrate Israel's ability to retain control over any
part of the area at any given time and exercise its authority therein.' 53
144. Roberts, supra note 144, at 64; EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTFRNATIONAI LAW OF
OCCUPATION 109-110 (1993); COHEN, supra note 141, at 53.
145. JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY-THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTEC-
TION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN THE OF WAR 20-22 (1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY OF THE
FOURTH CONVENTION].
146. Joseph H. H. Weiler, Israel, the Territories and International Law: When Doves are
Hawks, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS 381, 386-87 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds.,
1998).
147. Fleck, supra note 137, at 244; WATSON, supra note 34, at 138.
148. Shamgar, supra note 140, at 266.
149. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
150. See WATSON, supra note 34, at 176.
151. Gidon Levi, Oslo is Dead, HA'ARETZ, June 16, 2002, at B.
152. Israel's policy of assigning the residences of Palestinians residing in the West
Bank to the Gaza Strip further attest to Israel's control over the entire area. Indeed, this
conclusion was implicitly relied upon by the HCJ in the Assigned Residence case, supra
note 8, 1 13.
153. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council responding to the outbreak of the Intifada in
October 2000 stressed Israel's position as an occupying power. See S.C. Res. 1322, U.N.
SCOR, 4205th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (2000).
Cornell International Law Journal
This fact in itself seems sufficient to establish its status as an occupant
according to the standards provided by international law, as held by the
American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the "Hostage" case:
"While it is true that the partisans were able to control sections of these
countries at various times, it is established that the Germans could at any
time they desired assume physical control of any part of the country. The
control of the resistance forces was temporary only and not such as would
deprive the German armed forces of its status of an occupant."154
The text of the Fourth Geneva Convention is therefore applicable to the
context under consideration. The de facto control exercised by Israel over
these territories imposes the obligations of an Occupying Power, and
indeed renders any counter-argument unjustified and contrary to both the
letter and the spirit of the Convention. 155 Further, the HCJ acknowledged
Israel's obligations under the humanitarian provisions of the Convention
regarding recent operations conducted by the IDF in the Palestinian territo-
ries.' 5 6 It now remains to be determined whether international human
rights law is also applicable to the situation.
3. Human Rights Law
Human rights law, although interrelated with the law of war and humanita-
rian law, is a distinct branch of international law. Aside from well-estab-
lished customary norms of human rights, the corpus of international
human rights further incorporates various international and regional
human rights instruments. The most prominent international instrument
is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which Israel became a party to in 1991.1 5 7 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR
states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis added.)
Israel rejected any obligations emanating from the ICCPR it may have
been deemed to shoulder vis-a-vis the Palestinian residents of the territo-
ries. In its second periodical report to the Human Rights Committee
154. U.S. v. Wilhelm List, et al., TRIAl OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILI-
TARY TRIBUNALS 1230, 1243 (1948). This position was also adopted by the U.N. Inquiry
Commission. See U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at 13.
155. The ICTY identified the object of the Fourth Geneva Convention as "the protec-
tion of civilians to the maximum extent possible," thus expanding its application. See
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, App. Ch., July 15, 1999, 'I 168 [hereinaf-
ter Tadic Appeal]; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, ICTY App. Ch. Mar.
24, 2000, 152 [hereinafter Aleksovski Appeal].
156. Adallah case, supra note 8; Almadani case, supra note 131, at 35-6; H.C. 4363/
02, Zindah v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip (Judgment of May 28,
2002, not yet published; on file with authors); Assigned Residence case, supra note 8, 13.
157. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, K.A. 31, 269.
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(HRC),1 58 Israel stated that since the Palestinian Authority has the over-
whelming majority of powers and responsibilities in all civil spheres, Israel
cannot be internationally responsible for ensuring the rights under the
ICCPR in these territories. 159 It further maintained that
[T]he Covenant does not apply to areas that are not subject to its sovereign
territory and jurisdiction. This position is based on the well-established dis-
tinction between human rights and humanitarian law under international
law. Accordingly, in Israel's view, the Committee's mandate cannot relate to
events in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they are part and
parcel of the context of armed conflict as distinct from a relationship of
human rights. 160
Israel reiterated this position in its periodic reports' 6' to the Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.1 6 2 In rejecting both grounds
of Israel's contention, the Committee first observed that Israel continues to
exercise powers and responsibilities in the Palestinian territories. 163 Sec-
ondly, the Committee observed that fundamental human rights must still
be respected, notwithstanding the existence of an armed conflict. 164
The Committee's rejection of Israel's contention that the Palestinian
territories are not under its jurisdiction coincides with the HRC's expan-
sive interpretation of article 2(1).165 Cases involving the activity of a
State's agents in the territory of another State hold that the Covenant under
article 2(1) applies. 166 The European Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights adopts a similar approach regarding the applica-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
158. Under art. 40 of the ICCPR, the Parties are required to submit periodical reports
regarding the implementation of the rights provided for in the Covenant to the HRC. The
latter then issues its own reports with its concluding observations.
159. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Second Periodic Report, Israel, Nov. 20 2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/
2 (Dec. 4, 2001), 8, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
2cc0a33c394919e0c 1256be9002e 188?Opendocument.
160. Id.
161. Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Second Periodic Report, Israel, Aug. 3, 2001, U.N. Doc. E/19906.Add.32 (Oct.
16, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/f2b2f8fe4ab74627
c1 256bdb0054aa13?Opendocument.
162. Under art. 16 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights-1966, U.N. GA Res, 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
163. Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, 31 August, 2001, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add. 69 (Aug. 31, 2001), ' 11,
available at http://wvw.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/]9b934142bfa843ac1256abc
003095cb?Opendocument.
164. Id. at 12.
165. SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAl COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
65 (2000).
166. Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at
88, '1 12.3 (1981/1984); Montero v. Uruguay, Communication No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2 at 136, ci 5 (1983/1990); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communi-
cation No. 56/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 92, ccli 10.2-10.3 (1981./1984). See
also MANFRED NOWAK, CCPR COMMENTARY 142-43 (1993).
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doms. 167 Such interpretation seems most appropriate in circumstances
when a state exerts effective control over the inhabitants of a territory other
than its own.168
The Committee's observation regarding the second ground of Israel's
contention is more complicated and less self-explanatory. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapon Advisory Opinion addressed
the question of the applicability of the ICCPR during an armed conflict in
the following manner:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation
of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated
from in time of emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such
a provision. In Principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely,
the law applicable in armed conflict ... and not deduced from the terms of
the Covenant itself. 169
The Court then confined its review to analysis of the content and
scope of the right to life during armed conflicts. It is not entirely clear,
however, that the answer would be the same regarding other rights pro-
vided for in the Covenant. The matter is discussed in subsection 4.5
below, therefore we will observe only this: contrary to the Israeli view, the
International Court of Justice established the applicability of the Covenant
in situations of armed conflict and occupation. The exact content of its
provisions, however, may be influenced by the relevant provisions of the
law of war and of humanitarian law.
The context of the al-Aqsa Intifada generates the concurrent applicabil-
ity of three legal texts: the Hague law of war, the Geneva law of occupation
and human rights law. Before turning to examine their relevant provisions,
it is necessary to identify the subjects each text addresses.
167. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007/77, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 85, 149-50
(1979); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 24 (1995) [hereinafter
Louizidou case].
168. Loizidou case at 24; Watson argues, "The term jurisdiction presumably includes
Israel's extraterritorial jurisdiction, which, the Interim Agreement makes clear, can
extend to people in the west bank and Gaza Strip." See WATSON, supra note 34, at 174.
See also Eial Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the
Occupied Territories, 26 Isr. L. Rev. 24, 33-34 (1992). Cf. Bankovic v. Belgium, at http://
www. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp?Language=en&Advanced=l, where
the European Court held that NATO's 1999 military actions in Kosovo did not extend
the jurisdiction of the Parties of the Organization over these actions. Id. at 11 75-82.
169. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 96, at 240. The same approach
was also expressed by the Inter-American Commission regarding the co-applicability of
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and humanitarian law. See Tablada
case at 161. The Commission took the view that Provisions of the Convention which
have not been reproduced in AP II and which provide for a higher standard of protection
than the Protocol should be regarded as applicable. Id. at 166.
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C. A Matter of Status
In order to determine the legality of the Israeli policy of pre-emptive
targeted killings it is necessary to inquire into the legal status of the targets
because their status determines the degree of protection that they should
receive under the different fields of applicable law. The law of war is con-
cerned with combatants and with civilians, and accords different protec-
tion to each; the focus of the Fourth Geneva Convention is on "protected
persons," and human rights law applies to all people without discrimina-
tion, but not necessarily without differentiation. This subsection is con-
cerned with the conditions for eligibility for each status.
1. The Law of War: Combatants and Civilians
At the very heart of the corpus of the law of war lies the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants. 1 70 The former take part in the hostili-
ties and are legitimate military targets, while the latter do not, and there-
fore cannot be legitimate military targets. 7 1 This right conferred upon
non-combatants entails a corresponding duty on their part to refrain from
taking part in hostilities.' 7 2 A breach of this duty results in the loss of the
special protection to which non-combatants are entitled. ' 73 Furthermore,
as combatants entitled to participate in the fighting, 174 they cannot be
prosecuted once captured, and thus acquire a prisoner of war status.' 75
This status is not conferred upon non-combatants since they are forbidden
to take part in the fighting. Accordingly, they can be prosecuted for their
participation in hostilities.176
The question of identification is thus fundamental to this field of law.
The clear-cut definitions articulated in the days of the Hague laws con-
formed with the realities of warfare at the time. This is no longer the case.
The changing face of war, and in particular the internal nature of most
violent conflicts, blurs the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants.17
7
170. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 96, at 257.
171. DETTER, supra note 109, at 135; Horace B. Robertson Jr., The Principle of the
Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflicts, 8 USAFAJ. Leg. Stud. 35, 36 (1997). For
the historical development of the principle of distinction see id. at 36-41.
172. Fleck, supra note 137, at 210. Save the exceptional circumstances in which a
civilian population spontaneously rises against an invader as a levee en masse. See art. 2
of the Hague Convention IV; art. 13(6) of the First Geneva Convention; art. 13(d) of the
Second Geneva Convention; art. 4A(b) of the Third Geneva Convention. DET-rER, supra
note 109, at 140.
173. Fleck, supra note 137, at 232-33. For a comprehensive discussion on these rele-
vant provisions see infra section 111.4.1-111.4.2.
174. Art. 3 of the Hague Regulations; art. 43 of AP 1.
175. Art. 4A of the Third Geneva Convention; art. 44 of AP I. This, of course, does
not preclude the possibility of prosecuting them for acts, which do not constitute legiti-
mate fighting tactics, such as war crimes.
176. Fleck, supra note 137, at 68, 233.
177. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in the 21st Century Warfare, 2
Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 143, 158-161 (1999).
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(a) Combatants
Combatants were traditionally members of a State's armed forces. ' 78 Since
the principle of distinction relies heavily on the ability of the parties to
identify, and distinguish between, combatants and non-combatants,1 79 it
was duly incorporated into the provisions articulating the status of com-
batants. Article 1 of the Hague Regulations provided that the laws, rights,
and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer
corps that fulfilled the conditions of responsible command, a fixed distinc-
tive emblem recognizable from a distance, arms carried openly, and obedi-
ence to the laws and customs of war. In the same vein, Article 13 of the
First Geneva Convention, Article 13 of the Second Geneva Convention and
Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention all provide combatant status to
two categories of forces: first, the regular armed forces of the states or mili-
tias and volunteer corps acting on their behalf; second, militias and volun-
teer corps' 8 0 that are not part of these forces, but are nonetheless
supported by them (a category added in light of the realities of World War
II).181 While all groups are required to exhibit the conditions laid out in
the Hague Regulations, an explicit reference to these duties exists only in
regard to the second category, as the first is presumed to embody them
naturally.'18 2
With internal conflicts on the rise, these definitions lose much of their
validity, since they are rarely applicable to guerilla fighters or to members
of a national liberation movement. Recognizing this reality, AP I broad-
ened the definition of international armed conflicts to include, inter alia,
wars of national liberation movements.' 8 3 Article 43(2) of AP I proceeded
accordingly to re-define combatants as members of the armed forces speci-
fied in article 43(1) that includes "all organized armed forces, groups and
units" of a party to a conflict, "even if that Party is represented by a govern-
ment or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party." 18 4 Article 44(3)
further provides that "in order to promote the protection of the civilian
178. Except specific members of an armed force such as medical personnel and chap-
lains. See art. 28, 30 of the First Geneva Convention; articles 36, 37 of the Second
Geneva Convention; art. 33 of the Third Geneva Convention; Fleck, supra note 137, at
209-10.
179. Fleck, supra note 137, at 75-76.
180. Including organized resistance movements. The phrase is aimed to incorporate
Partisans movements. See JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY-THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELA-
TIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 52-53 (1960).
181. MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEw RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 233-34
(1982).
182. DETTER, supra note 109, at 136-37. It should be noted, however, that under the
Third Convention and the Hague Regulations, forces belonging to the second category
were deprived of their prisoner of war status upon failing to comply with those require-
ments. That was not the case in regards the forces contained in the first category. See
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAl PROTOCOLS OF 8Jui.Y 1977 TO THE GENIEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949 525-26 (Yves Sandoz et al., eds. 1987) (hereinafter COMMENTARY OF
THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS).
183. Art. 1(4). See also supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
184. Provided that the unrecognized party undertook to comply with the Protocol by
a unilateral declaration under article 96(3) thereof.
Vol. 36
2003 We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distin-
guish themselves from the civilian population while engaged in an attack
or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." However, when
"owing to the nature of the hostilities ... (he] cannot so distinguish him-
self' he shall retain his combatant status provided he carries his arms
openly "a) during each military engagement and b) during each time he is
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment pre-
ceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate." Interest-
ingly, although a failure on the part of a combatant to comply with the
rules and customs of war does not deprive him of his combatant status, 185
a failure to distinguish himself according to article 44(3) entails the forfei-
ture of this status. t8 6
Israel refused to accede to this instrument.' 8 7 Therefore, despite the
PLO's attempt to make a declaration under article 96,188 Articles 43 and
44 are inapplicable to the situation under consideration. What, then, are
the relevant rules by which combatants are identified in non-international
armed conflicts not regulated by AP I?
The customary distinction between persons taking part in the fighting
and those who do not is still applicable, 18 9 but it lacks definitive clarity.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions simply refers to "[plersons
not taking part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat'.1..." 90 Subse-
quent developments proceeded to articulate the definition of "those who
take part in the hostilities." As indicated above, 19 1 the Appeals Chamber
in the Tadic case defined these forces as either governmental forces or
organized military forces under responsible command. Indeed, the deter-
mination of an internal conflict as an armed conflict relies on the partici-
pation of both such groups. In the same vein, Article 1 to Additional
Protocol I1 (AP II), which defines the scope of the Protocol's provisions,
makes a similar reference to that incorporated in article 43 of AP I; that is,
that the armed forces be linked to one of the Parties to the conflict, that
they be organized, and that they be under responsible command. 19 2 Not
even AP II, however, equates the status of combatants in a non-interna-
tional context with their status in an international context. Since AP II
185. Art. 44(2) of AP I.
186. Art. 44(4) of AP I. The combatant is still entitled to procedural and substantive
protections equivalent to those accorded prisoners of war. See COMMENTARY OF THE
GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 537-38.
187. Gross, supra note 104, at 203-05; Christopher C. Burris, Re-examining the Pris-
oner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.CJ. Int'l L. Com. Reg. 943, 975-76 (1997).
188. GR1EN, supra note 101, at 107 fn. 37. The Swiss Government informed the Par-
ties that, owing to uncertainties regarding the status of Palestine, it could not decide
whether the declaration constituted a proper instrument of accession.
189. Tadicjurisdiction, at ' 119; Tablada case at 41 177.
190. Alex P. Peterson, Order out of Chaos: Domestic enforcement of the Law of Internal
Armed Conflict, 171 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2002) ("Common article 3 was meant to establish
fundamental humanitarian standards, not to define status.").
191. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
192. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 672; Peterson, supra note 190, at 22-23.
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contains no provision comparable to Article 43 of AP I, the protection
afforded combatants under the latter (entailing immunity from prosecu-
tion for combat actions and a prisoner of war status) does not seem to exist
in AP II.193 Indeed, the ICRC proposed at the 1972 Conference of Govern-
ment Experts a draft article providing for a treatment similar to that
accorded to prisoners of war in the Third Geneva Convention to other
groups of armed forces; it was rejected.' 94 It follows that while AP II
retained the customary distinction between combatants and non-combat-
ants, 19 5 neither requirements of distinction nor compliance with the rules
and customs have bearing on their status because they are not accorded
any special protection. 19 6 The problematic net result is that according to
customary laws of non-international conflicts, combatants are legitimate
military targets without any benefits attached to that status. 19 7
(b) Civilians
Considering that provisions protecting civilians and distinguishing them
from combatants existed before the Hague Regulations, it is notable that
no international instrument prior to AP I in 1977 provided a definition of
civilians or of civilian population. 198 Article 51(1) of AP I provides the
following residual definition:
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of
persons referred to in Art. 4(a)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva Con-
vention and in Art. 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is
a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not
come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its
civilian character.
193. BOTHE, supra note 181 at 671-72; Denise Plattner, The Penal Repression of Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts,
30 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 409, 414 (1990).
194. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 671 fn. 15.
195. By stripping civilians of the protection afforded to them once they participate in
hostilities and rendering them a legitimate military target. See Article 13 of AP II; COM-
MENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 183, at 1453, and the discussion pertain-
ing to civilians infra sections ll1.4.1.-Il.4.2.
196. Article 1 of AP I provides that the armed forces be able to implement the Proto-
col in the territory. However, this demand does not seem to imply that a failure to do so
deprives the applicability of the Protocol. Rather, it is yet another criterion by which the
level of control in the territory and over the population is measured. See COMMENTARY OF
THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 1353.
197. This is a problematic result insofar as the purpose and objectives of the interna-
tional humanitarian law are concerned, that is, to offer protection commensurate with
the status of either a civilian or a combatant to every person. Thus, in non-international
armed conflicts, combatants, like civilians, may be prosecuted for the participation in
the fighting. It should be noted that they are not completely without protection as the
laws of human rights are still applicable in such a situation. See discussion infra section
IV.
198. The Commentary of the Geneva Protocols notes that many definitions of the
civilian population have been formulated, but lacked the desired precision. See COMMEN-
TARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 610.
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As with combatants, AP II does not define civilians. It nonetheless
implies the same residual definition of AP I, and considers civilians as all
persons who are not members of the armed forces,' 99 in a manner
designed to exclude from its ambit persons who can be considered combat-
ants. 200 The realities of current conflicts, alas, defy this attempt at simplic-
ity: civilians do carry out various military related functions 20 1 and provide
support to combatants. 20 2 This militarization of the civilian population is,
indeed, a characteristic feature of non-international conflicts, where the
civilian population regularly provides combatants with food, shelter and
concealment, in a manner that renders it ever harder to distinguish
between civilians and combatants. 20 3 This reality questions the very use-
fulness of the principle of distinction.
Attempting to respond to this challenge, both AP I and AP II tried to
articulate a middle ground between the hitherto binary categories. The
solution which, like most of the provisions laid out in Article 51, derives
from customary international law, 20 4 provides that a civilian's participa-
tion in the military effort does not deprive the individual of his civilian
status, but it does diminish the protection guaranteed to him, and renders
him an unlawful combatant. 20 5 As such, he may be tried if captured. 20 6
Article 51(3) of AP 11 and Article 13(3) specifically provide that civilians
shall be afforded the protection due to them "unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities." This articulation is of vital impor-
tance as it demonstrates the limits to which the principle of distinction can
be stretched: a civilian who takes part in hostilities assumes the role of a
combatant, presenting an immediate threat to the adverse Party, and is
therefore not entitled to the protection afforded to civilians. 20 7 Unlike a
combatant, however, once he ceases his participation in the fighting he no
longer presents any danger for the adversary 20 8 and, having resumed his
civilian status, should receive the protection accorded to civilians and can-
not be targeted for an attack. 20 9 This construction broadens the scope of
the "civilian" category because it provides that a person taking direct part
in the hostilities is not necessarily a combatant. 2 10
199. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 672.
200. Id. at 611.
201. Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1
(2001); Stephen R. Sarnoski, The Status Under International Law of Civilian Persons Serv-
ing with or Accompanying Armed Forces in the Field, ARMY LAW. 29 (1994).
202. Schmitt, supra note 177, at 158-59.
203. MOIR, supra note 124, at 58-59.
204. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 317.
205. Richard R. Baxter, The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant, 27 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 235, 264-65 (1950).
206. GREEN, supra note 101, at 105; Turner & Norton, supra note 201, at 27-33.
207. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 301.
208. COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 1453.
209. Robert K. Goldman, Americas Watch's Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed
Conflicts, 9 AM. Uj. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 49, 67 (1993).
210. Fleck, supra note 137, at 211.
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Note, however, that the reference to people "taking direct part in the
hostilities" encompasses some, but not all, forms and functions of assis-
tance lent by civilians to combatants. In addition to the unequivocal com-
bative functions of killing, taking prisoners, and destroying military
equipment, participation also includes gathering information in the area of
operations, operating, supervising, and servicing weapons systems, and all
other activities that present a direct threat to the enemy. 2 11 It does not
include indirect participation in the war effort since the latter is often
required from the population as a whole to various degrees. 21 2 Such gen-
eral participation, does not render civilians as legitimate military targets,
though placing themselves in close proximity to military objectives 2 13
means that they assume the risk of attack. 2 14
(c) Terrorists
Terrorism, much like pornography, 2t 5 is more easily recognized than
defined. 2 16 Like pornography, too, this discursive illusiveness is essen-
tially due to the political and emotional baggage attached to the activity. 21 7
For our purposes, however, the debate over whether an act of violence is a
deplorable act of terrorism, or a laudable manifestation of heroism, is
immaterial. This conclusion derives from the observation that whereas
with respect to most human experiences, means determine status, this is
not the case when it comes to determining one's status under the law appli-
cable to non-international armed conflicts. Indeed, this characterization of
the conflict necessitates a distinction between the methods of combat and
the affiliation of the persons who carry them out. Means determine status
in the case of militias and volunteer corps operating in the context of inter-
national armed conflicts, 2 18 in non-international conflicts, where no pris-
oner of war status exists, unlawful conduct itself has no bearing on the
determination of status. The latter depends primarily on the organiza-
211. Id. at 232; Goldman, supra note 209, at 70-72.
212. COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 619; GREEN, supra
note 101, at 104-05.
213. For a definition of military objectives, see Article 52 of AP I, which is considered
to codify existing customary rules. Robertson, supra note 171, at 43-44.
214. Article 51(7) of AP 1; Turner & Norton, supra note 201, at 26-27; BOTHE, supra
note 181, at 672; GREEN, supra note 101, at 105.
215. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
216. William F. Wright, Limitations on the Prosecution of International Terrorists by the
International Criminal Court, 8 MSU-DCLJ. INT'L L. 139, 141 (1999);JOSEPH J. LAMBERT,
TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-23 (1990). DEETTER, supra note 109,
at 25. Torsen Stein, How Much Humanity Do Terrorists Deserve?, in Delissen & Tanja,
supra note 111, at 567, 569.
217. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism, in Bassiouni, supra note 112, at
765, 767; LAMBERT, supra note 216, at 13-14.
218. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text. This is not so in regards to mem-
bers of a state's regular armed forces: terrorist methods of warfare can be employed by
combatants and that in itself does not deprive them of their status. Stein, supra note 216,
at 573-74. They can, however, be prosecuted for such actions. Articles 82-8 of the
Third Geneva Convention; Fleck, supra note 137, at 80-81.
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tional level of the armed forces. 2 19 The existence of an armed conflict in
these situations is determined primarily by the intensity of hostilities (to
distinguish it from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or
terrorist activities in the first place). 2 20 It follows that when there is a non-
international armed conflict, the relevant laws of war apply and determine
the status of individuals as either combatants or civilians by the criteria
stated above, regardless of the means they employ.2 2 1 Thus, while guer-
rilla fighters and members of national liberation organizations are usually
referred to as "terrorists" by their adversaries, 2 22 this terminology does not
carry with it any bearing on their status in a non-international armed
conflict. 22 3
(d) Defining the Persons Targeted by Israel under the Applicable Laws
of War
The above review suggests that the status of the people targeted for pre-
emptive killings by Israel should always be made on a case-by-case basis.
As in most non-international armed conflicts, identifying combatants is
rather difficult since they assimilate themselves in the civilian population
with no distinguishing marks. Since the population provides members of
the Palestinian organizations with shelter, food and other assistance, it is
even harder to distinguish between civilians who take part in the hostilities
and those who do not. Generally speaking, Israel's targets, namely, high-
ranking members of Fatah/Tanzim, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, should usu-
ally be considered combatants. We reject the view that such people are
civilians because they are active members of organized forces that take part
in the conflict. 224 While definitions are admittedly hazy, the law of war
nonetheless distinguishes between civilians who take part in the hostilities,
and those who are full-fledged members of one of the rival forces. The
former are persons who provide some form support to one of the warring
parties, but they are not full-time fighters. The latter are just that.
It is, we submit, both inconceivable and counter-productive from a
humanitarian perspective to regard them in any other way. This is true
because they are hardly distinguishable from members of the armed forces.
Moreover, there are unintended implications linked to categorizing this
group as "civilians." First, such categorization reduces the conflict to the
level of unorganized disturbance. This is not the case. The degree of the
intensity of the violence and the level of organization of these groups is far
beyond internal unrest and justifies the imposition of the laws of war on
the situation. Second, this characterization is likely to have the effect of
219. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
220. Id.
221. Cf. Gross, supra note 104, at 205.
222. DETrER, supra note 109, at 145.
223. The term terrorist is applicable mainly during peacetime, where its characteriza-
tion is left mostly to the domestic legal systems. One should also note its relevance in
assessing the applicability of the various anti-terrorism conventions.
224. U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at 19; STATE ASSASSINATIONS,
supra note 3, at 29.
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reducing the protection enjoyed by civilians, as Israel is likely to seek an
expansion of the exception to the principle of distinction, leaving most of
the civilian population exposed to retaliation.
It does not follow that all people liquidated by Israel in the exercise of
its policy of targeted pre-emptive killings are, indeed, combatants. The
innocent bystanders were clearly civilians who found themselves in the
wrong place at the wrong time. Some were civilians who provided assis-
tance to the Palestinian organizations on a regular basis, but were not them-
selves members. Insofar as the legality of any specific action under the
laws of war depends on the status of the target, the inescapable conclusion
is that its determination has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
2. Humanitarian Law: Protected Persons
While the law of war revolves around the distinction between combatants
and civilians, the Fourth Geneva Convention addresses "protected per-
sons." Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 define them in the following manner:
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at any given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occu-
pation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals.
Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belliger-
ent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as
protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.
The Convention thus applies to both persons of enemy nationality pre-
sent in the territory of a belligerent state and to the inhabitants of occupied
territories. 2 25 The phrase "in the hands oF' implies a wide and general
application of the Convention to any of the persons mentioned above on
the basis of that person's mere presence in either the occupied territory or
in the territory of the enemy state. 226
The first two paragraphs exclude from the ambit of the Convention the
nationals of the occupying state; nationals of a state which is not party to
the Convention; and nationals of a co-belligerent state or a state that con-
ducts proper diplomatic relations with the occupying state. The definition
further implies that persons with no nationality are covered by the Conven-
tion.22 7 Since the population of the Palestinian territories consists mostly
of refugees and persons with no nationality, problems of applicability do
not seem to arise. 2 28 At the same time, a significant segment of the inhabi-
tants holds a Jordanian nationality, and Jordan and Israel do maintain dip-
lomatic relations. 2 29 A textual reading of the Convention would thus seem
225. COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION supra note 145, at 45. The Commen-
tary states that this issue was never under dispute.
226. Id.; Tadic Judgment at TI 579-80.
227. COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION, supra note 145, at 47.
228. Since Palestine is not a recognized state it cannot confer nationality.
229. It should be noted, however, that Israeli-Jordanian relations have been under a
strain since the outbreak of the Intifada, which almost resulted, at one point, in their
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to deprive such people of their "protected persons" status. We submit that
this is not the case and that a teleological reading of the Convention, as well
as the modern construction of "nationality" under international law, leads
to the conclusion that the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel
who are nationals of Jordan are also "protected persons."
Indeed, the ICTY held that the nationality requirement of the Fourth
Geneva Convention should be construed in a broad manner so as to com-
ply with the object and purpose of humanitarian law, which "is directed to
the protection of civilians to the maximum extent possible. "230 It therefore
found that the nationality requirement of Article 4 should be analyzed in
light of the substance of the relations rather than their legal characterization
under domestic legislation. 2 3 1 Thus, it was determined by the Tadic,23 2
Aleksovski 23 3 and Celebici23 4 Appeals Chambers that ethnicity, rather than
nationality, was the determining factor in the conflict, and the fact that the
victims and the perpetrators shared the same nationality could not in itself
prevent the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention. True, the ICTY's
jurisprudence refers to the situation where both parties to the conflict
share the same nationality, which is not the case at hand. But the rationale
behind this interpretation, resting on the general need to maximize human-
itarian protection, and on the specific question of whether the state of
nationality can provide real redress to its nationals, applies equally to the
Palestinian inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel who hold a
Jordanian nationality. 2 35 This conclusion finds strength in the well known
trend in international law to construct nationality in terms of substance,
genuine link, and effectiveness. 236 Arguably, therefore, ICTY's extension
of the nationality principle could be applied to situations in which the vic-
tim is a national of a third State that maintains proper diplomatic relations
with the occupying power, so long as there is no genuine link between the
two. Since Jordan renounced all connection with these territories and their
inhabitants,2 3 7 and since the inhabitants define themselves as Palestinian
rather than Jordanian, no such genuine link of nationality exists between
them and Jordan, and, therefore, they should not be excluded from the
ambit of Article 4.
termination. See Dany Brener et al., Jurdan Forbade Israelis Entrance and Took It Back,
MA'ARIV, Apr. 2, 2002, at 6 (Hebrew).
230. Tadic (Appeal) at 91 168.
231. Delalic v. Prosecutor, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ICTY App. Ch., Feb. 20, 2001,] 383-4
[hereinafter Celebici (Appeal)].
232. Tadic (Appeal) at 3l 164-68.
233. Aleksovski (Appeal) at 3cl 151-52.
234. Celebici (Appeal) at 33 82-84.
235. Tadic (Appeal) cl 165 states that "those nationals are not 'protected persons' as
long as they benefit from the normal diplomatic protection of their State; when they lose
it or in any event do not enjoy it, the Convention automatically grants them the status of
'protected persons."'
236. Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International Humanitarian
Law, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 397-402 (1998).
237. Hussein, King of Jordan "Statement concerning Disengagement from the West
Bank and Palestinian Self-Determination," July 31, 1998, 28 I.L.M. 1637 (1988).
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Finally, the Convention excludes persons specifically protected by the
First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions. 23 8 It follows that combat-
ants are not entitled to the protection guaranteed by the Fourth Convention
because in an international armed conflict one of these three conventions
protect them.2 39 When combatants are not protected by these Conven-
tions, as in this case, they are probably protected by the Forth Geneva Con-
vention, because the aim of the drafters was to leave no person
unprotected. 2 40 This interpretation also coincides with the object and pur-
pose of the Convention to maximize the protection of individuals under
occupation. In any event, when stripped of their arms and placed hors de
combat, combatants are entitled to at least the minimum protection
afforded by Article 3 of the Convention. 24
1
3. Human Rights Law: All People under the Jurisdiction of a State
The rhetoric of law is a finely tuned instrument. In human rights law, the
musical scale allows for variations to be played around the terms "distinc-
tion," "differentiation," and "discrimination." As indicated above, human
rights law concerns rights enjoyed by all people at all times. Article 2 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of
the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory
to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-gov-
erning or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 24 2
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR reiterates the same idea, and the prohibition
on discrimination articulated therein is contained in Articles 3, 26, 4(1),
23, 24 and 25 of the Covenant. Nonetheless, while human rights are
accorded to all human beings, differentiation of treatment is allowed if
established as legitimate. The HRC has held in General Comment 18:
The Committee believes that the term 'discrimination' as used in the cove-
nant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion restriction or
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impair-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on all equal foot-
ing, of all rights and freedoms .... [N]ot every differentiation of treatment
will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are rea-
sonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legiti-
238. COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION, supra note 145, at 46.
239. Murphy, supra note 99, at 24. The aim of the Convention was to leave no person
without some degree of protection. See COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION, supra
note 145, at 51.
240. COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION, supra note 145, at 51.
241. MoIR, supra note 124, at 59-60. For further discussion on common article 3 see
infra section 111.4.1.
242. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 71, U.N. Doc. A/180 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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mate under the Covenant. 243
It follows from the fundamental concept of human dignity that human
rights law excludes no human being from protection, whether a combatant
or a civilian. The provisions of human rights law apply in full to residents
of the Palestinian territories. But this does not endow the same treatment
to all people. Differentiation is allowed, and specific provisions carry con-
siderations attuned to the specific right in the prevailing circumstances.
D. Relevant Legal Provisions
Israel's controversial policy of targeted killings receives a variety of refer-
ences, ranging from extra-judicial executions and political assassina-
tions 244 to liquidations and acts of self-defense. 245 The term used surely
reflects one's political point of view, but also connotes the different legal
framework within which the speaker places the action. Extra-judicial kill-
ings and political assassination are not terms usually identified with com-
bat terminology, but rather with human rights regimes; liquidation and
self-defense on the other hand, are commonly used in combat situations,
but are foreign to human rights terminology. This sub-section seeks to
clarify this point by identifying the different provisions in each legal frame-
work and by examining the legality of this policy according to these
provisions.
1. The Basic Principle of Distinction
The starting point of this analysis is the customary principle of distinc-
tion,246 applicable to both the Hague law and the Geneva law. This princi-
ple introduced the basic rule that non-combatants receive protection from
attacks, while combatants do not. The relevant provisions generated from
this principle and applicable in non-international armed conflicts are laid
out in Common Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in articles 4
and 13 of AP II, and in customary law.
Common Article 3 provides:
In case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction .... [T]o this end, the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
243. U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1 at 26 (1994).
244. U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at 17-18. This is the term
also used by the Commission, the Palestinian Authority, and Amnesty International.
See, e.g., STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3, at 6.
245. Terms used by Israel. See U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at
17-18.
246. See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text.
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(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;...
(d) The passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previ-
ous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
people.
The customary status attained by the article is no longer disputed. 24 7
Its rules, described as "elementary consideration of humanity,"24 8
represent the minimum mandatory treatment to accord to anyone who has
ceased to take part in the hostilities, civilians and hors de combat alike, in
any armed conflict. 24 9 Article 3 does not include a comprehensive prohi-
bition on attacks directed at the population as a whole; its original goal
was to ensure humane treatment of persons not actively engaged in bat-
tle. 250 This, however, was changed in later developments discussed below.
2. The Law of War
The principle of distinction further develops in Articles 4 and 13 of AP II.
While there is much debate whether AP II is now customary law in gen-
eral, 2 5' there is little doubt that these two articles enjoy such status.
Article 4, while not considered a restatement of existing law at the
time of its drafting, as it expanded the provisions of Common Article 3,252
has over the years attained the status of a customary norm.2 53 The article
requires respect for the person, honor and convictions of persons who do
not take part in the hostilities, or who cease participation, whether or not
their liberty has been restricted. Such persons must be treated humanely
and protected from, inter alia, acts of violence. Much like Common Article
3, Article 4 of AP II pertains to both civilians and persons who are hors de
combat. 254
247. Tadic (Jurisdiction) at 1 102; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case. No. ICTR-96-4, T. Ch.
1, Sep. 2, 1998, ' 608 [hereinafter Akayesu case]; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-
21-T, ICTY T. Ch. 1I, Nov. 16, 1998, '1 316 [hereinafter Celebici (Judgment)]; Prosecutor
v. Furund-ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY T. Ch. 1I, Dec. 10, 1998, C 138 [hereinafter
Furund-ija (Judgment)].
248. Military and paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 L.CJ. 14, 114 (June 27).
249. Id.
250. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 667; Goldman suggests that while article 3 does not
contain a prohibition on attacks against the population not under the party's control, it
may encompass such prohibition in respect to civilians in areas under the control of that
party. Goldman, supra note 209, at 60.
251. According to Green "much of Protocol I1 is little more than a reaffirmation of the
basic principles of humanitarian law binding on all states." See Green, supra note 123,
at 507; Georges Abi-Saab, The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law:
Some Preliminary Reflections, in Delissen & Tanja, supra note 111, at 115, 119. See also
Tadic (Jurisdiction), 'l 117. Cf. MoIR, supra note 124, at 144; Christopher Greenwood,
Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols, in Telissen & Tnaja, supra note
239, at 93, 113.
252. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 641.
253. MOIR, supra note 124, at 144 fn. 52; Akayesu case, 616.
254. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 640; COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra
note 182, at 1370.
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Article 13 of AP II is also significant to the issue at hand. It provides:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general pro-
tection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to
this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not
be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in the hostilities.
At the time of its drafting, Article 13 was innovative because it explic-
itly prohibited the targeting of civilians. The customary principle of dis-
tinction, however, which is the basis of the article, was already part of the
customary rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts.2 5 5 Fur-
thermore, the prohibition articulated therein, and designed to protect
"those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities" in non-
international armed conflicts, is now a well-established principle of cus-
tomary international law. 256 This provision then rectifies an omission in
Common Article 3, but does so in light of the latter's ultimate purpose.
Article 13 does not contain an explicit prohibition on disproportion-
ate and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population. This is due
to the drafters' desire to simplify the text of the article, and does not imply
any intent to exclude these prohibitions from the ambit of Article 13.
Indeed, the principle of proportionality "cannot be ignored in applying
Protocol II."257 The applicability of these customary prohibitions to non-
international armed conflict was reaffirmed by the holdings of the ICTY in
the Tadic2 58 and Kupreskic259 cases.
The protection guaranteed to civilians under the laws of war while giv-
ing evidence of some expansion is nevertheless quite limited: First, opera-
tions directed at legitimate military targets that inevitably involve civilian
casualties are allowed so long as the harm to civilians is proportionate to
the aim pursued. Second, civilians are protected only to the extent they do
not take part in the hostilities. 260 These exceptions should therefore be
examined.
A party's privilege to engage in attacks is subject to several basic prin-
255. MOIR. supra note 124, at 116-7; COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra
note 182, at 1448 ("Article 13 codifies the general principles that protection is due to the
civilian population against the dangers of hostilities, already recognized by customary
international law and the law of war as a whole.").
256. Tadic (Jurisdiction) at 'I 119,
257. This is despite the drafters' rejection of such explicit provisions, similar to those
that had been introduced into article 51 of AP I. See BOTHI, supra note 181, at 677-78.
Meron suggests that these prohibitions are derived directly from the principle of human-
ity that govern internal armed conflicts. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 74 (1989).
258. Tadic (Jurisdiction) at 'l 127.
259. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. tT-95-14/2, ICTY T. Ch. I1, Nov. 14, 2000, q
524.
260. Id. at l 522.
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ciples. 26 I The principle of distinction requires that only legitimate mili-
tary targets be the objects of the attack and that the means and methods
employed could in fact discriminate between combatants and non-combat-
ants. 26 2 The principle of proportionality further imposes the obligation to
balance between the desired aim and the damage inflicted, thereby subject-
ing the means and methods used to the standard of reasonableness. 26 3
Indeed, one does not only measure the legitimacy of a target against its
status and the objects of an attack, but also by its effects and necessity. 26 4
These principles are as significant as their application is elusive.
Assessments of anticipated military advantages, incidental damage, and
the ratio between the two are by nature quite subjective. 2 65 Subjectivity,
however, is present in any meaningful decision-making process and is
neither synonymous with bad faith nor defies judgment. A determination
can and should be carried out in good faith2 66 and after collection of ade-
quate information. 26 7 There are other factors for measuring the reasona-
bleness of an attack, including the number of casualties anticipated, 268 the
importance of the target, its location, whether the means employed exceed
those sufficient to destroy it, and the existence of any alternative, less
harmful, means.
The second exception to the protection afforded to civilians concerns
civilians who take a direct part in the hostilities. Non-international con-
flicts are characterized by the growing participation of civilians in the hos-
tilities.2 69 The test applicable to the determination of whether or not a
person's actions amount to the taking of "a direct part in the hostilities" is
whether they "by their nature or purpose, are likely to cause actual harm to
the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces," 2 70 and whether
they present an immediate threat to the adversary. 2 7 1 These criteria
represent the appropriate interpretation of this exception because the
exception is just that: an exception to the general rule, which protects civil-
ians, and, as such, should be narrowly construed. 272 The rationale under-
261. COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 1449-50.
262. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 96, at 257; Robert A. Ramey,
Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REv. 1, 36-39
(2000).
263. GREEN, supra note 101, at 330-31. Another imposing principle is the prohibi-
tion on causing unnecessary suffering to combatants. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, supra note 96, at 257; Ramey, supra note 262, at 39-40.
264. Article 51(5) of AP 1. See William j. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and
Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 Mu_ L. REV. 91, 111-12 (1982); Schmitt, supra
note 177, at 150.
265. Parkerson, supra note 100, at 59.
266. COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 1449.
267. Fleck, supra note 137, at 221.
268. Or the cumulative number of casualties resulting from repeated attacks. See
Kupreskic case at 9[ 256. Indeed a single attack may be lawful, while the repetition of
such an attack may not, depending on the cumulative effect.
269. See discussion supra notes 198-214 and accompanying text.
270. COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS, supra note 182, at 619.
271. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 303.
272. Fleck, supra note 137, at 211.
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lying the subjection of civilians to attack is the fact that they pose a threat
to the adverse party. As long as this threat is neither imminent nor severe,
alternative means to prevent the threat from materializing exist. Under
these circumstances, a civilian is not a legitimate military target; he can be
captured and, indeed, prosecuted, but not killed.
The same restrictive interpretation should be applied to the temporal
aspect of such participation. It is commonly argued that a civilian, prepar-
ing to take direct part in the hostilities or returning from combat, is a legiti-
mate target as he is assumed to still pose a present and immediate threat to
the adversary. 27 3 We do not agree with such a general assumption. The
assessment of the threat such a civilian poses should be made on a case-by-
case basis. The proportionality principle imposes a duty to evaluate the
military need in such action against the availability of other means in the
particular circumstances.
In sum, non-combatants should receive the utmost protection from
acts of violence involved in hostilities. This is the working presumption
that informs the laws of war. As long as civilians do not present a direct
and immediate threat to the adverse party by taking part in the hostilities,
they cannot be the objects of an attack. Any military attack, even one
directed against legitimate targets that may entail excessive harm to the
civilian population, is prohibited. Any uncertainty regarding the legality of
an act potentially detrimental to non-combatants should work in favor of
non-combatants.
Combatants are not so entitled. They are legitimate military, targets
regardless of their specific whereabouts, even if not engaged in any threat-
ening activity, 27 4 although usually they are less likely to be targeted when
removed from the vicinity of combat. 2 75 It does not follow that combat-
ants are deprived of all guarantees. Military necessity must be balanced
against the principle of humanity to the extent that methods and means of
warfare that inflict unnecessary suffering on combatants are prohibited. 2 76
It is for this reason that Article 4 of AP II provides that "it is prohibited to
order that there shall be no survivors. ' 277 It is for this reason that once a
combatant is hors de combat as a result of injury or surrender he can no
longer be regarded as a legitimate target, and is entitled, if not to the rights
of a prisoner of war, at least to the minimum standard of human treatment
guaranteed in Common Article 3.
273. Goldman, supra note 209, at 70; MOIR, supra note 124, at 59 fn. 114 ("military
operations clearly must include travel to and from the attack site, even though no action
is taken in the transit"). Cf. Tablada case, cl 189 ("[T]he persons who participated in the
attack on the military base were legitimate military targets only for such time as they
actively participated in the fighting.").
274. The Commentary of the Geneva Protocols: "Those who belong to armed forces
or armed groups may be attacked at any time." See COMMENTARY OF THE GENEVA PROTO-
COLS, supra note 182, at 1453. See also Goldman, supra note 209, at 67.
275. Turner & Norton, supra note 201, at 26.
276. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 96, at 262-63. This principle is
usually referred to in the context of weapons capable of inflicting excruciating physical
suffering. See Ramey, supra note 262, at 40-42.
277. BOTHE, supra note 181, at 640.
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Thus, the laws of war seem to accept the legitimacy of targeting com-
batants and, to a narrower extent, civilians taking part in the fighting. In
regards to the former, it is not necessary for Israel to resort to alternative
means in order to prevent them from carrying out their hostile plans or
actions. Not so with respect to the latter. Furthermore, an action against a
legitimate target can only be regarded as a legitimate act of war if the dam-
age is proportionate to the end pursued with respect to civilian casualties.
The application of these principles to some ground realities may well clar-
ify them and substantiate our argument for a case-by-case determination.
On July 23, 2002, a missile with a one ton warhead was fired from an
F-16 plane at a building in Gaza, killing sixteen people (nine of whom
turned out to be children), injuring over eighty people, and destroying four
residential buildings. The object of the operation was to kill Salah
Shehada, the commander and founder of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Bri-
gades, the military wing of the Hamas,278 the organization that took
responsibility for numerous suicide bombings in Israel's territory.
Shehada is clearly a combatant and therefore a legitimate military target,
regardless of his specific actions during the attack. The devastating impact
of the operation, however, taking into account the relevant factors, 27 9
clearly fails to meet the proportionality standard. The laws of war do not
justify this action.
Dr. Thabet Thabet was shot to death upon entering his car in the
morning of December 31, 2000 in Tul-karem in area 'A,' some 250 meters
from the border separating area 'A' from Israel. Dr. Tahbet was a dentist
with UNRRWA and the Secretary of the Fatah organization in the city of
Tul-Karem. Israel contended that "his role as commander of a Tanzim cell,
who instructed his people where to carry out attacks. . . removes him from
the civilian category." 280 This case is illustrative of the problematic nature
of the Israeli policy. First, it is not at all clear what part exactly was played
by Thabet in the Fatah Organization. 2 8 1 Second, both the location of his
home and his regular driving through Israeli security check-points attests
to the ready availability of alternative, less harmful means to achieve the
security needs of Israel. 28 2 Third, because he was driving to his clinic
when killed, he was not engaged in any hostile activity. Under these cir-
cumstances, therefore, Thabet should not have been killed by Israel.
Muhanad Taher was the head of the Hamas military organization in
the Samaria area ('A'). On July 1, 2002, Israeli forces attempted to arrest
Taher, who was hiding at a house in Samaria. Upon their approach, the
Israeli soldiers encountered fire from the hiding place. The Israeli soldiers
started shooting back, killing Taher and two other Hamas activists. 28 3 The
278. Yoav Limor et al., IDF Assassinated the Leader of Hamas in Gaza Yesterday,
MA'ARIV, July 23, 2002, at 10 (Hebrew).
279. See supra notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
280. STATE ASSASSINATIONS, supra note 3, at 17. 0
281. Thabet was known as a great supporter of the peace process. See id. at 16.
282. Id. at 17.
283. Yoav Limor et al., Naval Commando Closed a Score with Hamas Leader, MA'ARIV,
Jul) 1, 2002, at 2 (Hebrew).
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killing of Taher and his fellow combatants was a legitimate military opera-
tion, in view of the status of the targets and the circumstances of the opera-
tion: an immediate and proportionate act of self-defense during combat.
3. Humanitarian Law
The law of occupation imposes a general duty upon the occupant to pro-
vide for the well-being and safety of the occupied population, 28 4 and fur-
ther details the humane manner with which the occupying power is to treat
the occupied people. 28 5 The Fourth Geneva Convention, however, seems
neither to recognize the right of the occupied population to resist the occu-
pying power, 28 6 nor to regulate such resistance once it occurs. 2 8 7 Indeed,
only two provisions relate to the treatment of those involved in such resis-
tance in occupied territories, 2 88 and they fall far shorter of adequate regu-
lation. Articles 5 and 68 are only concerned with the rights of such
persons once they are in the custody of the occupant. 289 There are no
provisions that control the targeting of persons involved in hostile acts
against the occupying power.
AP I rectifies this omission. It legitimizes resistance and national liber-
ation movements and regulates the conduct of hostilities once .the course of
events reaches the level of an armed conflict. Curiously, however, the pro-
visions of Article 51(3) of AP I and of Article 13(3) of AP II, whereby a
civilian taking a direct part in the hostilities forfeits his civilian status,
seem to be included in the Fourth Convention. 2 90 This was indeed the
Israeli position expressed before the U.N. Inquiry Commission, and the
284. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.
285. In addition to the minimum guarantees of humane treatment enumerated in
Common Article 3, the rules regarding the treatment to which protected persons are
entitled by the Fourth Geneva Convention are laid out in article 27, according to which
their persons, honor, family rights, religious convictions, and property are to be pro-
tected. The Convention further introduces a host of detailed provisions prohibiting
infliction of physical suffering (art. 32), the taking of hostages (art. 34), reprisals, collec-
tive penalties, intimidation, and acts of terror (art. 33), and provides for humane treat-
ment and rights of communication of protected persons who are in the custody of the
occupying power (art. 76).
286. Baxter argues that while the Convention authorizes the occupant to penalize and
punish acts detrimental to its security, it nonetheless imposes no duty of obedience to
the occupant upon the occupied population. See Baxter, supra note 205, at 260-63.
287. Although article 27 provides that "the Parties to the conflict may take such mea-
sures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a
result of the war." The most extreme measures approved by the Convention are found in
section I1 of part Ill, which is concerned with aliens in the territory of a party to the
conflict; internment and assigned residence. See Article 41 of the Convention.
288. Roberts, supra note 143, at 79-83.
289. Article 5 provides that in regards hostile acts committed in occupied territories,
detained suspected perpetrators "shall, in those cases where absolute military security
so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present
Convention." Article 68 is concerned with defining permissible penalties imposed on
protected persons and distinguishes, to that effect, between serious acts of sabotage (or
espionage) and hostile acts not aimed at "life or limb of members of the occupying
forces or administration" or posing no grave danger or damage to property of the occu-
pant. Only acts included in the first category can entail the death penalty.
290. Fleck, supra note 137, at 232; GREEN, supra note 101, at 102, 105.
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Commission, somewhat surprisingly, concurred with this statement (while
declaring the primacy of humanitarian law over the law of war in the con-
text of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). 29 1
The silence of the Fourth Convention can be construed in a variety of
ways: First, that the laws of war apply in such a situation with no altera-
tions. This possibility, however, seems problematic because it seems to
contravene the main thrust of the Convention and to ignore the power reali-
ties entailed in an occupation. Second, that the Convention rejects the
legality of compromising the physical integrity of any person belonging to
the occupied population, an interpretation that coheres with the primary
concern of the Convention, is nevertheless unlikely because would entail a
prohibition on any act of justified self-defense on the part of the occupying
power. A third way to construct the silence of the Convention introduces a
balance between the dialectics of the above options, according to which, the
law of occupation, while embracing the principles of a legitimate military
target, should nonetheless put an emphasis on a different set of considera-
tions, tilting the balance of interests against those of the occupying power
and in favor of the inhabitants of the occupied territory. This option can
be inferred from Article 5, which differentiates between hostile acts taking
place in the territory of the occupant and those taking place in the occu-
pied territories, providing greater protection in the latter case.29 2 It is our
position that this interpretation is not only the most sensible in the light of
the realities of occupation (especially a prolonged occupation), but also the
purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 29 3 This position also finds sup-
port in recent developments in international criminal law, discussed
below.
4. International Criminal Law
Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention imposes on the parties to the
Convention the duty to criminalize and sanction those who commit grave
breaches of the Convention. Article 147 states:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involv-
ing any following acts, if committed against persons or property protected
by the present Convention:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experi-
ments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected per-
son, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power,
or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial
291. U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at 19 ("Civilians lose the pro-
tection under the Fourth Geneva Convention when they become combatants by taking a
direct part in hostilities."). The Commission, however, did not accept Israel's contention
that the victims of its policy were indeed combatants. Id.
292. COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION, supra note 145, at 57.
293. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text. The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion's purpose is to maximize the protection accorded to the occupied population on one
hand, while acknowledging the need to derogate from such protection in extreme situa-
tions on the other hand.
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prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military neces-
sity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The criminality attached to the violations of the prohibitions enumer-
ated in the Geneva Convention has long been indisputably recognized. 29 4
Such grave breaches, however, did not include violations of Common Arti-
cle 3 since they were not committed against protected persons.29 5 In fact,
the notion of war crimes was limited to situations of international armed
conflicts. 2 96 This is no longer the case. The ICTY's Appeals Chamber in
the Tadic case, skillfully pointing to the existence of individual criminal
responsibility incorporated into many states' military manuals and domes-
tic legislation, as well as into the resolutions of the Security Council, 29 7
declared:
All of these factors confirm that customary international law imposes crimi-
nal liability for serious violations of common Article 3, as supplemented by
other general principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal
armed conflicts, and for breaching certain fundamental principles and rules
regarding means and methods of combat in civil strife". 298
The imposition of individual criminal responsibility to violations of
humanitarian law and the laws of war applicable to non-international
armed conflicts was reaffirmed by the ICTY in the Delalic case 2 99 and by
the ICTR in the Akayesu case. 300 The ultimate validation of this position is
in Article 8(2)(c)-(f) of the Rome Statute: 30t
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, seri-
ous violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention or any other cause:
294. See Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, SC Res. 827, 25 May 1993,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993); Article 8(2)(a) of the
Rome Statute.
295. MOIR, supra note 124, at 156-57; Meron, supra note 110, at 559. But see Article
4 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, between 1 Jan.
1994 and 31 Dec. 1994, S.C. Res. 955, Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
296. Final Report of U.N. War Crimes Commission of Experts (for Yugoslavia), U.N.
Doc. S/1994/674, para. 42 (1994). That was also the position adopted by the ICRC. See
Plattner, supra note 193, at 414 (1990).
297. Tadic (Jurisdiction) at '1 128-33.
298. Id. at ' 133.
299. Cclebici (Judgment) at q 316.
300. Akayesu case at 3 617.
301. For a description of the preparatory work on the article during the Rome Confer-
ence, see MOIR, supra note 124, at 163-66.
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(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, afford-
ing all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as
indispensable.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework
of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.
The contribution of Article 8(2)(c)-(f) to the law of war and to humani-
tarian law is not confined to its reaffirmation of individual criminal liabil-
ity. The inclusion of the rules applicable to non-international armed
conflict further establishes their acceptance and customary character.
30 2
Thus, the illegality of targeting non-combatants and the unreasonable kill-
ing of numerous civilians caught in the line of fire is reinforced and
receives a new and effective dimension. It is not only the state, but also
those personally responsible for such violations that may now find them-
selves susceptible to criminal prosecution by the international community.
This development, substitutes for the silence in the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion regarding the treatment of the civilian population in times of resis-
tance to occupation.
5. Human Rights Law
Israel's policy of state targeted killings affects numerous rights of the Pales-
tinian population, but none are as important as the right to life. It is this
right which is at the center of our discussion of the applicability of human
rights law to the situation.30
3
Rights are not absolute. Their content is examined and determined
against the rights and interests of others. This corpus of law thus incorpo-
rates the concepts of national security, public order, and public emergency.
Indeed, the ICCPR recognizes the need to resort to extreme measures in
extraordinary circumstances in Article 4(1), stating that, in times of public
emergency, states may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the Covenant. Some rights, however, are of such a fundamental
character that states cannot derogate from them. The right to life, excluded
302. Since 1998, the Rome Statute was signed by 139 states and ratified by 81. Its
universal acceptance and character contributes significantly to the ongoing process of
lawmaking in these fields and the affirmation and creation of customary norms. For a
discussion on the part played by custom in the development of humanitarian law, see
Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humani-
tarian Law, 90 AJ.I.L. 238 (19 9 6 ).
303. One may add the right to fair trial, right to privacy, and the rights to protection
of the family and children.
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from the ambit of Article 4(1) by Article 4(2), is one such right. 30 4 It fol-
lows that the state of emergency declared by Israel30 5 does not allow it to
derogate from the right to life. This right is specifically guaranteed in Arti-
cle 6(1) of the ICCPR: "Every human being has the inherent right to life.
This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life." 30 6
Relating specifically to extra-judicial killings, the Human Rights Com-
mittee (HCR) placed a special interest on the excessive use of force exer-
cised by states' security forces, 30 7 and concluded that:
The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life which is explicitly
required by the third sentence of article 6(1) is of paramount importance.
The Committee considers that States parties should take measures not only
to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent
arbitrary killing by their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the
authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law
must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be
deprived of his life by such authorities. 30
8
304. General Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, '1 10 (1994).
Other examples are the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treat-
ment or punishment and the prohibition on slavery other rights have little to do with a
state of emergency and therefore cannot be suspended as, for example the prohibition
on imprisonment for inability to fulfill a contract; in regards to some, derogation may be
impossible such as freedom of conscious.
305. Israel indeed declared the existence of a state of emergency resulting from "con-
tinuous threats of war, of actual armed attacks, and campaigns of terrorism resulting in
the murder of and injury to human beings." Israel had thus found it necessary to dero-
gate from article 9 of the convention, which otherwise would have had the effect of
limiting its authority to exercise powers of arrest and detention. In referring to Israel's
declaration, the HRC indeed recognized "the security concerns in the State party, the
frequent attacks on the civilian population, the problems linked to its occupation of
territories and the fact that the State party is officially at war with a number of neighbor-
ing States." Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 1 4 (Aug. 18, 1998). It nonetheless voiced its concerns as to
its continued nature and recommended limiting its territorial applicability. The Commit-
tee's observation seems to indicate its acceptance of the existence of a state of emer-
gency in Israel. At least in regard to the Palestinian territories, Israel's assertion seems to
conform to the restrictive standards set by the European Court of Human Rights and its
jurisprudence, which defined such a situation as "an exceptional, actual or imminent
situation of crisis or emergency, which affect the whole or part of the population or
nation and which constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which
the state is composed." See Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 56 (1960).
Thus, uncontrolled rioting, shooting and bomb explosions that took a heavy toll on the
lives and property of the Northern Ireland population had amounted to a public emer-
gency. See Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 14-15, 78 (1978).
306. The article further subjects the right of states to impose the death penalty to
certain conditions; it may only be imposed according to the law, for the most serious
crimes, and can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment by a competent court
(art. 6(2)). The death penalty must neither be imposed on persons under the age of 18
nor carried out on pregnant women (art. 6(5)).
307. ANNA-LEANA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
STATES OF EXCEPTION 395 (1998).
308. General Comment No. 6, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\Rev.1 at 6, para. 3 (1994).
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The HCR harshly criticized Peru for the excessive force used by its
military and paramilitary forces against persons suspected of terrorist
activity. While condemning the "atrocities perpetrated by insurgent
groups" and "the scale of terrorist violence, which shows no consideration
for the most basic human rights," the Committee nonetheless held that
combating terrorism with arbitrary and excessive state violence, including
numerous extra-judicial executions, cannot be justified under any
circumstances. 3
0 9
The Inter-America Court of human rights shares this position. For
instance, in the Neira Alegria case, the Court faced the question of whether
the suppression of a riot brought on by detainees suspected of terrorist
activities resulting in the death of seven people was carried out lawfully. 3' 0
The Court held that notwithstanding the fact that the detainees were
highly dangerous and armed, the force used to suppress the riot was dis-
proportional and excessive, thus entailing the responsibility of Peru for vio-
lation of the detainees' right to life. 3 1'
Human rights bodies seem to narrowly interpret a state's right to
resort to force in response to threats to its security interests. 31 2 It is thus
not surprising that in the latest report to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary, or arbi-
trary executions referred to the Israeli policy as a "grave human rights vio-
lation." 3 13 This assessment of the Israeli policy is better understood in
light of its pre-planned element. Unlike an immediate response to an out-
break of violence, often leaving no time for hesitation nor room for the
employment of alternative means, Israel's policy seems to obstruct the pos-
sibility of resorting to an available judicial process, a right provided for the
by article 14 of the ICCPR.
From a human rights point of view, the Israeli policy as a whole is an
unjustified and illegal infringement of the right to life. Human rights law
cannot sustain actions that result in so high a death toll. The jurispru-
dence of human rights bodies suggests that specific and pinpointed killing,
even of a person whose employment of terrorist means has been undis-
puted, cannot be considered legal. Only in rare and exceptional circum-
stances could such an operation be justified. For instance, in a specific
case where concrete information points to an operation aimed at attacking
the civilian population that is already underway, and cannot be prevented
by any other available means, it is reasonable to assume that the killing of
the perpetrators of the operation would be justified. Similarly, forces
attempting to arrest a suspect, having encountered the latter's violent resis-
309. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, Sept. 25, 1992,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.8, 11 8 (1992), available at http://ww,.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9541131000fdc 163802564dc0058c93 1?Opendocument.
310. Neira Algeria et al. Case. (19/1/95) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 41, OAS/Ser. L/V/1ll.33,
Doc. 4 (1995).
311. Id. at 58.
312. WATSON, supra note 34, at 178-79.
313. Civil and Political Rights, Including questions of: Disappearing, and Summary
executions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/74 (Jan. 9, 2002).
Vol. 36
2003 We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law
tance, and then having resorted to fire and killed him, may also meet the
standard of human rights law.3 14 As we demonstrated, however, human
rights law is not the only legal text applicable to the context of the al-Aqsa
Intifada within which the Israeli policy of preemptive targeted killings takes
place. In what way, then, does this law interact with and affect the applica-
tion of other applicable legal regimes? Concluding Section IV addresses
this and other issues.
Conclusions: Is it Legally Permissible for Israel to Engage in
Pre-emptive Targeted Killings?
"So let us be explicit, if it seems a nasty thought that death and pain are at the
center of legal interpretation, so be it ... As long as death and pain are part of
our political world, it is essential that they be at the center of law The alterna-
tive is truly unacceptable .... 315
The above review and analysis suggest some fairly clear answers to
aspects of the question of the legality of the Israeli policy of targeted kill-
ings. The relatively clear answers are those that evidence no discrepancy
between the three legal frameworks applicable to the situation. They pro-
vide the following:
1. The targeting of combatants and of civilians who take a direct part in
the hostilities during combat is permissible. 31 6
2. The targeting of non-combatants who do not take part in hostilities is
forbidden 3 17 and amounts to a criminal act under international law. 3 t8
3. The targeting of non-combatants who took part in the hostilities, but are
no longer thus engaged, that is, killing which is undertaken for past deeds,
is forbidden 3 19 and entails criminal responsibility. 320
This still leaves open the following pertinent questions: Is it permissi-
ble to target combatants removed from the location of a battle? What is the
extent of the protection afforded to civilians who belong to Palestinian mili-
tary organizations, but not directly engaged in fighting? Under what con-
ditions can an action taken by Israel in pursuit of said policy be considered
proportionate? These questions are open to interpretation because the
applicable legal texts do not cohere on any of them. While the laws of war
are permissive, human rights law is restrictive and the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention is silent. It is our position that this interpretation must relate to,
314. See, e.g., the killing of Taher, supra note 283 and accompanying text.
315. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1628 (1986).
316. See supra notes 269-77 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
318. See Articles 8(2)(e)(i), 8(2)(c)(i) and 8(2)(c)(iv) of the Rome Statute. See also
Djamchid Momtaz, War Crimes in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under the Statute of
the International Criminal Court, Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 177, 185 (1999).
319. See discussion supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
320. As they are considered civilians, the rules cited in supra note 318 apply. See text
accompanying note 256.
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and be informed by, all three frameworks, and that it is both possible and
advisable to reconcile their provisions and perspectives.
The view that maintains the need for a clear separation between the
laws of war and of occupation and human rights law rests on theoretical,
practical and analytical arguments. On a theoretical level, the distinction is
based on the dividing line between war and peace. It is argued that the law
of war, designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities, is conceptually
opposed to the law of human rights, designed to reflect harmony in human
society during peacetime." 32 1 It follows from this distinction that war is a
rare disruption in the course of normal harmony and that due to the differ-
ences in the development, theoretical basis, and goals of these fields of
law, 32 2 "[t]he law of war is a derogation from the normal regime of human
rights. '3 23 On a practical level, it is argued the law of war is better suited
for the specific circumstances of battle and thus provides a far more
detailed and practical standard for military compliance than human rights
law can and does provide.3 24 Analytically their fields of applicability are
indeed different, as the law of human rights applies between the state and
its nationals or other people subject to its jurisdiction, while the law of war
applies between states.
32 5
The view that maintains that these fields of law co-exist on a contin-
uum, rather than across a dividing line considers violence to be an aspect
of, rather than an exception to, the normal course of international life.
Accordingly, this view emphasizes the principle of humanity that lies at the
core of the laws of war, the law of occupation and human rights law,
32 6
and points to their concurrent development. 3 27 Indeed, there is no concep-
tual difference between the law of human rights and the law of war and
occupation, at least as they stand today. These regimes promote human
dignity and physical integrity and attempt to minimize, if not eliminate,
human suffering. This is most apparent in the fast-evolving rules of non-
international armed conflicts not aimed at regulating the relationship
between states, but rather, between the state and its inhabitants. In that
sense, they have not only the same application as human rights rules but
also share the same goals.3 28 The criminalization of human rights atroci-
ties committed during armed conflicts and entailing personal accountabil-
321. Peterson, supra note 190, at 36; G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights in Acta Juridica 193, 205 (1979).
322. Draper, supra note 321, at 199.
323. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime and the Law
of Armed Conflict, I IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 191, 206 (1971).
324. Fleck argues "the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the relevant
rules of customary law take precedent, as law specifically regulating belligerent occupa-
tion." Fleck, supra note 137, at 241.
325. Draper, supra note 321, at 204; Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict:
The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 7-11 (2001).
326. Furund -ija (judgment), 3[ 183; Celebici (Judgment), '1 200; Tablada case, 3[ 158;
Meron, supra note 97, at 266.
327. Stephens, supra note 325, at 12-13.
328. MOIR, supra note 124, at 193-94.
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ity further attests to the blurring of the boundaries and the growing
rapprochement between these fields of law.
This approach does not deny that an armed conflict or an occupation
poses special difficulties that human rights law is not always adequately
equipped to handle. 3 29 It does maintain, however, that inadequacy is not
tantamount to inapplicability, and that human rights law, even if not
directly applicable, nevertheless informs the manner with which the laws
of war and of occupation are to be interpreted and applied. 330 Indeed, the
ICJ held that while the law of war and humanitarian law provide lex
specialis, the application of human rights in situations of conflict is not
suspended. 33 ' This was also the approach adopted by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which emphasized Israel's obliga-
tion under the Covenant regardless of the existence of an armed conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians. 33 2
Thus, human rights law should affect the interpretation of the specific
rules of the laws of war and occupation in a manner that elevates "the
humanitarian aspects and priorities of the law of armed conflict and
ensure[s] that these 'weighted' humanitarian aspects must be considered
when determining the legitimacy of military actions."3 33 This is the case
when the law of occupation is added to the mixture. Normally, the law of
occupation is more specific than the law of war, as it is designed to
respond to problems emanating from the special relationship between an
occupant and an occupant population, and to promote the wellbeing of the
latter. While the law of occupation is thus the lex specialis, taking prece-
dent even over human rights law,3 3 4 in cases where the law of occupation
provides no clear answers, human rights law steps in and assists the law of
occupation. Human rights law reinforces the weight to be given to the lat-
ter's principles and objective, that is, to protect the occupied population
and provide for its wellbeing.
Finally, there is yet another factor. The Palestinian territories have
been under Israel's rule for over 35 years. The drafters of the Fourth
Geneva Convention did not foresee such a prolonged occupation, and
329. Michael J. Matheson, The Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AJ.I.L. 417, 423 (1997). In light of the derogation
clauses in international human rights instruments that should rarely be the case.
Human rights law incorporates a tool providing it with guidelines applicable in states of
public emergency. The derogation clauses further establish the connection between the
different regimes; Article 4(1) of the ICCPR clearly states that derogation may not con-
flict with other international obligation incumbent upon a state. It thus opens the door
for the non-derogable rules of war and humanitarian law, which represent the "absolute
minimum of protection." SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 307, at 378.
330. WATSON, supra note 34, at 174-75.
331. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 96, at 240.
332. Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 163, at clH 11-12.
333. Stephens, supra note 325, at 15.
334. U.N. INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, at 19; Jochen Abr. Frowein,
The Relationship Between Human Rights Regimes and regimes of Belligerent Occupation, 28
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 11 (1998).
Cornell International Law Journal
therefore sought merely to maintain a status quo, imposing only limited
duties upon the occupier. 33 5 The Convention, therefore, does not meet the
needs of a population occupied for so long, and additional protection and
guarantees are required. These are provided in human rights law.3 36 This
observation also sheds further light on the failure of the Convention to
regulate adequately the resistance an occupying power may face. 3 37 It is
quite plausible to assume that the Convention remained silent on the mat-
ter seeking to regulate a temporary relationship. Considering a long-term
occupation, the Convention may have questioned its legitimacy, and may
have recognized the legitimacy of resistance to it, and regulated its manifes-
tations accordingly. 33 8
At the very least, this situation requires that more severe restrictions
be imposed on the occupying power's rights. General human rights obliga-
tions and the added responsibilities Israel, as the occupying power,
assumed over the Palestinian population, should place restrictions on
Israel's actions. The balance of interests should clearly shift in favor of the
Palestinian population in every operation carried out by Israel. It follows
that while the specific provisions of the law of war provide the framework
for the examination of Israel's conduct, their content and scope now
include a primary factor; the duty to ensure the wellbeing of the Palestinian
population and its safety. This interpretative construction allows us to
respond to the hitherto open questions articulated above, in the following
manner:
1. Combatants are only legitimate targets if all other means to apprehend
them fail. Pre-emptive targeting of individuals who pose an immediate
threat to Israel's security should be an exceptional measure, not a policy.
Israel is under the heaviest of burdens to substantiate its claim of a person's
culpability. With no judicial oversight over the decision-making process, the
individual is deprived of all means of protecting himself and of defending
his innocence. This heavy burden should further restrict Israel's ability to
engage in targeted killings, thus considerably minimizing their occurrence.
The possibility of targeting a person could therefore be limited to incidents
where there is an extremely high probability that the individual poses a sig-
nificant risk to Israel's security and no other recourse is materially
feasible. 33 9
335. Roberts, supra note 143, at 71. The scope of these duties further decreases as of
one year after the general close of military operations. See article 6 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
336. Id.
337. See supra section 111.4.3.
338. The COMMENTARY OF THE FOURTH CONVENTION, supra note 145, states: "[1]f the
Occupying Power is victorious, the occupation may last more than a year, but as hostili-
ties have ceased, stringent measures against the civilian population will no longer be
justified." Id. at 63.
339. It should be noted that a failure to follow these guidelines does not necessarily
amount to a criminal act, as the customary laws of war permit the targeting of combat-
ants without imposing such conditions once the requirements of necessity and propor-
tionality are met. See notes 256-77 and accompanying text. It does, however, entail
Israel's international responsibility.
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2. Non-combatants may not be targeted. As an occupying power, Israel
possesses the ability to apprehend the suspect and should therefore exhaust
every means in its power to do so. Even if unable to do so, Israel is not
permitted to target the individual, even upon his return from a military
action.340 The lives of persons belonging to a Palestinian military organiza-
tion, but who are not in fact combatants themselves (such as Dr. Tabath)
may not be compromised. They may be prosecuted for any assistance pro-
vided to the military wing of the organization enabling an attack upon civil-
ian lives and property. But as they pose no immediate threat to Israel's
security they cannot be targeted by the IDF.
3. Any targeted killings that entail risks to civilians should take into con-
sideration the responsibility Israel assumes over their lives and property. In
the light of the fact that the Palestinian territories are densely populated, and
that most operations can only take place within these territories, only excep-
tional circumstances will enable the execution of such operations that have
little harmful effects. This is also relevant to the methods employed in these
operations. It does not take a particular military expertise to realize that the
impact of a one-ton warhead missile from an F-16 is likely to have a very
harmful effect. Indiscriminate attacks of such kind are criminal under inter-
national law.
3 4 1
Our analysis concludes that while a specific act of preemptive killing
may be legal if it meets the above-specified requirements, the policy of state
targeted preemptive killings is not. Furthermore, some specific acts of
targeted killings may generate state responsibility, while others may consti-
tute a war crime entailing criminal accountability. These conclusions,
emanating from the reading of the three legal texts applicable to the con-
text, and informed by a sensibility that coheres them, do not rest on a
negation of the importance of the national interest in security. On the con-
trary, these conclusions incorporate and express the way it should be bal-
anced with a minimum standard of humanity and against the relevant
context.
This delicate, ever precarious balance is at the heart of the democratic
discourse. A democratic state is not a meek state. True, it is fighting with
"one hand tied behind its back,"'3 42 as soberly observed by Chief Justice
Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, but democratic sensibilities internalize
this limitation on State power, not as a source of weakness but as a sign of
strength. Democracies require a public discourse forever alert to the
importance of human rights, suspicious of the way power is used, and
committed to the rule of law. The legal culture, in turn, while not a substi-
tute for this public discourse, is never absent from it and indeed serves as a
catalyst for its development.
340. As is the case with rules pertaining to combatants, supra note 339, it is not
entirely clear whether targeting an individual upon his return from action necessarily
amounts to a criminal act. See note 273 and accompanying text. It is our submission,
however, that in such a case, more often than not, the principles of proportionality and
necessity are not met.
341. See notes 257-68 and accompanying text. Indiscriminate attacks against pro-
tected persons thus fall under both Article 8(2)(c)(1) and Article 8(2)(e)(i); Momtaz,
supra note 318, at 185.
342. Torture case at 1488.
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We therefore reject the notion that the policy of targeted killings,
designed by Israel as a way to combat terrorist attacks, is beyond the pur-
view of the rule of law. 34 3 We also deny the purist position suggesting that
the legalistic nitty-gritty preoccupation with details entailed in the above
discussion is likely to obscure and legitimize a harrowing policy;3 44 one
that, on principle, should be condemned. 34 5 This position in fact main-
tains that the legality or illegality of targeted state killings is not a legiti-
mate issue of discussion; that while an emergency situation may
exceptionally necessitate the deed, it should never be elevated to the sphere
of the Word. 3 46 We appreciate the sensibility of this position, but, alas, do
not find it sensible. Indeed, nor would the people who consider themselves
victims of the policy of targeted killings, and appeal to the courts to inter-
vene. 34 7 Purity belongs to the Platonic world of ideas; it is a necessary
ideal to strive for, even if forever unachievable in this all too fallible City of
Man. 3 4  In the best of all possible worlds 349 law would be superfluous; in
this world, it is a necessary, albeit insufficient means to achieve some pos-
sible betterment. This article hopes to contribute to this modest goal.
343. See Barakeh case, supra note 9. The Court's concise judgment, reproduced here
in its entirety, reads: "We read and widely listened to the claims of the Applicant's repre-
sentative. It seems to us that the announcement given on behalf of the Respondents
supplied an exhaustive response to the Applicant's claims. The choice of means of war-
fare, used by the Respondents to preempt murderous terrorist attacks, is not the kind of
issue the Court would see fit to intervene in. This is the case a fortiori when the appeal
lacks a firm factual foundation and seeks a sweeping redress."
344. Indeed, such a position would seem to suggest the inadvisability of international
humanitarian law in its entirety, insofar as that law is based on the positivist admission
that violent conflicts do take place, rather than on the antecedent, normative, position
that they should not take place. At the same time, we do not propose that law, and
behavior according to law, offer any substantive solution to either the problem of occu-
pation or to terrorism: law is derivative; it is an instrument of a political order. At best, it
can rectify some of the latter's abuses; at worst, it can justify and perpetuate them.
345. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS 137-41 (1992).
346. See, e.g,, SLOVOJ ZIZEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL: FIVE ESSAYS ON
SEPTEMBER 11 AND RELATED DATES 112-14 (2002). Zizek discusses the issue of torture as
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the act of torture itself has to be taken. The acknowledged cost of being charged with
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as its starting point the notion that torture is on principle illegal but that law may pro-
vide guidelines differentiating between cases where the principle holds and cases where
it gives way to other considerations such as the "ticking bomb" situation. This latter
position, argues Zizek, elevates the torturous deed into a universal principle, thereby
erasing the sense of guilt and the awareness of the unacceptability of the deed.
347. See the LAW appeal, supra note 11.
348. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 1941); ST. AUGUSTINE,
CITY OF GOD, BOOK XI 429-70 (Henry Bettenson trans., 1972) (1467).
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